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Understanding Narrative Texts: Inferences Made During Reading by Children With and 
Without Language Impairments 
Brenna McClintock 
Successful reading comprehension relies on a number of abilities, including 
decoding and using linguistic and world knowledge to link text propositions.  While 
difficulties with reading comprehension are well documented for children with Specific 
Language Impairment (SLI), only a handful of studies have investigated the inferences 
children with SLI make as they read.  The present study examines the inferences made by 
children with SLI during and after reading, with particular attention to causal inferences, 
considered critical to good comprehension.  The common procedure for assessing 
inferences - asking comprehension questions after reading - was combined with the more 
novel approach of eliciting children's thoughts about the text as they read ("think-aloud").  
Twelve children with SLI (M age = 10;2) were compared to 12 age-matched peers 
with typical language development (TLD). The SLI group had lower scores than the TLD 
group on literal comprehension questions, and inferential questions requiring 
informational and causal inferences.  The think-aloud data were consistent with these 
findings, and additionally showed that the causal inferences of the SLI group were less 
accurate than in the TLD group.  Nevertheless, both groups had higher scores on 
comprehension questions after engaging in the think-aloud, with the improvement in the 
SLI group driven by a significant improvement in causal comprehension.  The results are 




memory, and discussed in terms of reading comprehension theories.  Practical 
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In the elementary school years, children progress from “learning to read” to 
“reading to learn”.  Reading to learn, a major component of academic success, is a skill 
that requires good reading comprehension (Chall, 1983); many children, however, 
struggle with fully comprehending what they have read.  In 2010, approximately 15 to 
20% of children in the U.S. were considered to have a reading disability (National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development [NICHHD], 2010).  Literacy levels in 
Canada are also of concern.  Approximately 30% of 15-year-old Canadians have not yet 
achieved a level of literacy that is considered to be a functional level in a knowledge 
economy (Statistics Canada, 2010). 
 Difficulties with reading comprehension have been attributed to a number of 
different factors.  These include difficulties with decoding (Gough & Tunmer, 1986) and 
reading fluency (Cutting & Scarborough, 2006; Kim, Petscher, Schatschneider, & 
Foorman, 2010), weaknesses in oral language comprehension (Catts, Fey, Zhang, & 
Tomblin, 1999; Clarke, Snowling, Truelove, & Hulme, 2010), and difficulties with 
cognitive abilities such as working memory (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Cain, Oakhill, & 
Lemmon, 2004; Perfetti & Zhang, 1996) and attention (McInnes, Humphries, Hogg-
Johnson, & Tannock, 2003).  Children’s failure to actively engage with text by asking 
questions, monitoring their comprehension, and inferencing also contributes to poor 
reading comprehension (Shanahan, 2006). 
 Inferencing is broadly defined as a form of reasoning used to relate explicit and 
implied information (Colman, 2009; NICHHD, 2006).  In the literature on reading, the 




(Botting & Adams, 2005, p. 50), and includes the reader's ability to draw conclusions by 
connecting propositions in a text (“text-to-text” inferences) and integrate textual 
information with world knowledge (“text-to-world” inferences) (van Kleeck, 2008; 
Zwiers, 2010).  For children, skill with both kinds of inferences is associated with good 
comprehension (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2005).  Children who read below age and 
grade level, including many with Specific Language Impairment (SLI), have particular 
difficulty with making text-to-world inferences (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Norbury & 
Bishop, 2002).  Given that children with SLI are a major focus of the present study, the 
nature of SLI will be discussed at length below.  In general terms, SLI refers to impaired 
first language development in the absence of other major developmental delays.   
Models of Reading and Reading Impairment 
The Simple View of Reading 
 The simple view of reading is an influential model of reading proposed by Hoover 
and Gough (1990).  In this model, reading is the product of decoding ability and 
linguistic comprehension (R = D x L).  Decoding is the ability to identify printed words 
efficiently, whereas linguistic comprehension is the ability to interpret lexical information 
in order to derive meaning from information at the sentence-level in text, and in 
conversation.  Decoding and linguistic comprehension are equally important; neither 
component alone is sufficient for successful reading.  Reading occurs successfully when 
printed words are identified accurately, and when meaning is successfully derived from 
words and the syntactic relationships between them (Cutting & Scarborough, 2006).  
Amongst good readers, decoding and linguistic comprehension are positively related: 




components improve, so does reading comprehension (Hoover & Gough, 1990).  
Support for the simple view of reading comes from studies in which the 
contribution of decoding and oral language skills to reading comprehension was 
investigated.  The contribution made by the combination of the two components varies 
significantly according to the measures used, but is consistently large: 47% in Kendeou, 
van den Broek, White, and Lynch (2009), and as high as 72% in Cutting and Scarborough 
(2006).  Furthermore, the weight of each component changes as children become 
proficient readers.  Kendeou et al. (2009) found that amongst typically developing 
preschoolers, oral language skills predicted as much as 28% of the variance in decoding 
skill.  As children learned to decode more fluently, oral language played less of a role in 
decoding ability, and oral language and decoding began to predict reading comprehension 
independently.  By second grade, both decoding and oral language skills made significant 
and independent contributions to reading comprehension, with oral language predicting 
more of the variance in reading comprehension than decoding.   
Catts et al. (1999) found that scores on oral language measures of kindergarten-
aged children were the single, strongest predictors of reading comprehension and word 
recognition difficulties in grade 2.  Fifty-seven percent of the poor readers had been 
identified in kindergarten as having impairments in receptive language, while 50% had 
been identified as having expressive language problems (implying that some children had 
mixed expressive and receptive difficulties).  These percentages were four to five times 
greater than those found among good readers.  Thus, both decoding and oral language 
skills play an important role in a child’s ability to comprehend what is read.  As children 




comprehension increases.  This finding has important implications for students who 
experience weaknesses in either, or both, decoding ability and oral language.  
The Simple View and Reading Impairments 
For good readers, the simple view states that the relationship between decoding 
and linguistic comprehension is positively related.  This, however, is often not the case 
for children with reading disabilities, who display three distinct reading profiles (Gough 
& Tunmer, 1986).  In two of these profiles, decoding and linguistic comprehension are 
dissociated, resulting in (1) classic dyslexia or (2) hyperlexia (more recently referred to in 
the literature as poor comprehending).  In dyslexia, decoding is impaired while linguistic 
comprehension is average.  In poor comprehenders, decoding ability is at or above levels 
expected for chronological age, while linguistic comprehension is impaired (Clarke et al., 
2010).  The third profile, referred to as ‘garden variety reading disability’ or ‘generally 
poor readers’, involves deficiencies in both decoding and linguistic comprehension.  For 
this group, performance on both components falls below what would be expected for 
chronological age.  
Recent research has shown that children with SLI are a heterogeneous group.  
Some fit the poor comprehender profile while others fit the generally poor reader profile 
(Kelso, Fletcher, & Lee, 2007).  However, even when children fit a generally poor reader 
profile, their language comprehension abilities may be significantly below their decoding 
abilities.  For example, Bishop and Adams (1990) found that 8-year-olds with SLI 
obtained significantly lower scores on measures of decoding accuracy and reading 
comprehension than their typically developing peers.  In the SLI group, “reading 




1033) and were better explained by poor language comprehension than by poor reading 
accuracy.  Therefore, while reading fluency difficulties cannot be ruled out, the nature of 
SLI suggests poor language comprehension as a significant contributor to reading 
difficulties.   
Specific Language Impairment (SLI) and Reading Impairment 
 The nature of SLI. Children with SLI have persistent difficulties with first 
language acquisition that manifest in the various domains of language (phonological, 
semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic).  Expressive and receptive language skills may both 
be affected, or expressive skills may be the principal difficulty (receptive problems alone 
are rare).  The problem is of unknown cause, although genetic factors are believed to be 
important (Rice, Smith, & Gayán, 2009).  To be diagnosed with SLI, children must meet 
certain exclusionary criteria.  They must have normal hearing, no neurological problems, 
and score within normal limits on nonverbal intelligence tests (Rice, 2009).  Thus, 
children with hearing loss, known neurological conditions (such as epilepsy), intellectual 
disabilities, or a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder are excluded from the diagnosis 
of SLI.  
 Nonetheless, there is some debate as to whether the problems experienced by 
children with SLI are specific to language.  Some researchers assert that language 
difficulties are accompanied by cognitive deficits not identified by standard intelligence 
tests, and others argue that the difficulties are restricted to language (see Silliman & 
Scott, 2006; Windsor, 2002 for the debate).  This debate will not be resolved in the 
present study.  Regardless of the viewpoint regarding the nature of SLI, what is of 




for problems in reading (Catts, Bridges, Little, & Tomblin, 2008; Catts, Fey, Tomblin, & 
Zhang, 2002).  
Reading difficulties of children with SLI. Several studies have assessed the risk 
of developing a reading impairment amongst children with SLI.  Catts et al. (2002) found 
that 41.8% of the children in their study who had been diagnosed with SLI in 
kindergarten were considered to have a reading disability in grade 2 and this proportion 
remained high at 35.9% in grade 4.  These proportions were four to five times greater 
than the number of students diagnosed with a reading disability in a non-impaired control 
group.  The majority of the students with SLI who did not meet criteria for having a 
reading disability in second or fourth grades nonetheless scored below average on 
measures of reading achievement.  
Not only are reading difficulties evident early amongst children with SLI, they 
continue to persist throughout the later school years.  Students with SLI who performed 
significantly below their typically developing peers on measures of reading 
comprehension in second grade continued to demonstrate a reading comprehension 
deficit in fourth, eighth, and tenth grades (Catts et al., 2008).  In tenth grade, the students 
with SLI performed at a sixth grade level for reading comprehension, which was 
significantly below the level of the typically developing group.  Clearly, children with 
SLI are at increased risk for persistent difficulties with reading comprehension.  A closer 
look at the specific skills that contribute to reading comprehension is required in order to 
gain a better understanding of why these difficulties occur.  
Elaborated Two-Path Model of Reading 




just two necessary components (decoding and linguistic comprehension), Hoover and 
Gough (1990) do not deny that reading is a complex task.  Rather, the authors argue that 
the complexities of reading lie within these two components.  That is, both decoding and 
linguistic comprehension are overarching categories, and each comprises multiple skills 
that are necessary for successful reading comprehension.  Van Kleeck (2008) elaborates 
the two components of the simple view to provide a more detailed view of the skills 
required to decode and comprehend text.  In this model, inferencing is considered to be a 
core component of the oral language pathway of reading comprehension; it enables a 
student to engage in classroom discourse, and facilitates understanding of text.  In the 
literature, inferencing is also referred to as a higher-level cognitive skill; the reader 
actively engages with the text to derive a meaningful and coherent representation of it 
(Cain, Oakhill, Barnes, & Bryant, 2001; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996a).  More recently, 
inferencing has been described as being situated at the interface of language and 
reasoning (Newton, Roberts, & Donlan, 2010).  Inferencing is thus a complex skill that 
draws on both language and cognitive ability. 
Model of Text Comprehension 
Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model identifies comprehension of 
linguistic input, world knowledge, and working memory as crucial to inferencing and to 
successful comprehension of text.  According to this model, the reader draws on a 
knowledge base composed of networked concepts and propositions that are activated as 
the text is read.  Comprehension occurs in two phases.  In the construction process, the 
first phase of text comprehension, the meaning of concepts and propositions that 




For example, if the word ‘bank’ is read within the text, the concepts that might be 
activated from within the reader’s knowledge net are ‘bank’ as a financial institution, and 
‘bank’ as a riverbank.  Associated concepts, such as ‘money’, ‘savings’, ‘mud’, and 
‘river’ might also be activated.  These concepts may be the ones required to comprehend 
the text, but might potentially be incorrect given the context of the story.  Without having 
fully processed the sentence or phrase, it is possible that any of the propositions are 
relevant to the text.  Generating multiple propositions from the reader’s knowledge base 
enables him or her to elaborate on the text; each generated proposition acts as a potential 
inference.  Thus, at the end of the construction process, the reader is left with an enriched 
but incoherent and potentially contradictory representation of the text.  
In the integration phase of the text comprehension process, the information 
derived in the construction phase is integrated to form a coherent and meaningful text 
representation.  The text is processed in short sentences or phrases at a time.  As 
additional information becomes available, the reader uses his or her working memory to 
carry information forward so that the next part of the text can be processed and connected 
meaningfully.  In this way, the incorrect or inappropriate propositions and inferences that 
were activated and generated from the reader’s knowledge base during the construction 
phase are excluded, and replaced by propositions and inferences that are more 
appropriate to the context of the text.  For example, as the reader processes the sentence, 
‘Mary went to the bank to deposit her paycheck’, the concepts, ‘bank’ as a riverbank, 
‘mud’, and ‘river’ that were generated during the construction phase would be excluded, 
and ‘bank’ as a financial institution, ‘money’, and ‘savings’ would be retained.   




controlled inferences are made by the reader to fill in and causally connect incoherent 
parts of the text.  If the required and correct proposition or elaborative inference was not 
generated in the initial construction phase, the entire process begins again.  The end-
result of the integration phase is a coherent and meaningful representation, comprising 
many relevant inferences that both elaborate on and connect different parts of the text.  
Inferencing and Reading Comprehension in Good and Struggling Readers 
Inferencing typically develops, as it relates to reading, between the ages of 6 and 
12 (Cain & Oakhill, 1998).  As was discussed, inferencing has two components.  It 
requires that the reader (1) connect different parts of text using linguistic cues (e.g., by 
connecting the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ with previously-named characters in the text) 
(“text-to-text” inferences in Cain & Oakhill, 1999; “cohesive” inferences in Bowyer-
Crane & Snowling, 2005) and (2) draw upon his or her existing world knowledge in order 
to fill any gaps in information in the text, or to elaborate on information that is given 
(“text-to-world” inferences, van Kleeck, 2008).  Questions that target a child’s 
inferencing ability can be used to determine how much of the information in a story or 
text was processed by the child (Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  Such questions have shown 
that children who experience difficulty with reading comprehension have greater 
difficulty making text-to-world inferences than text-to-text inferences (Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2005).  Text-to-world inferences will be the focus of the present study.  
Text-to-World Inferences 
In the literature, text-to-world inferences have been categorized in many ways.  In 
the taxonomy described by van Kleeck (2008), adopted in the present study, there are 




inferences require that the child link two parts of a text while incorporating his or her 
own world knowledge to fill in any gaps in information.  In the context of reading a story, 
causal inferences link crucial story components (i.e., the initiating event or problem of the 
story; the protagonist’s internal states, goals, and attempts to resolve the problem; the 
consequences of these attempts; and finally, the solution or outcome of the problem).  For 
an example of causal inferences, a text written for the present study can be used.  In the 
story “Anna and Her Dog” (see Appendix A), Anna is playing fetch with her dog.  Given 
the sentences, “She threw the ball too far.  It went into the woods.  Anna waited but her 
dog didn’t come back.”, a reader might infer, using his or her world knowledge about 
woods, that Anna was waiting because her dog had gone to fetch the ball, and had not 
returned because it had gotten lost while searching for the ball in the woods.  
The second inferencing category is informational.  Informational inferences 
involve using world knowledge to elaborate information explicitly stated in the text, such 
as information about setting.  Informational inferences create a richer representation of 
the text, but are not essential to comprehension (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2005; Cain 
et al., 2001; van Kleeck, 2008). Consider again the story “Anna and Her Dog”.  In the 
story, Anna takes her dog on a walk.  Based on the story sentence, “They stopped by the 
swings to play”, the reader might use his or her world knowledge about probable 
locations of swings to infer that Anna is walking her dog in a park. 
The third and final type of inference described by van Kleeck (2008) is 
evaluation.  Evaluation enables the reader to use his or her existing values and world 
knowledge to make judgments of morality, convention, or anomaly about situations in the 




and Her Dog”, Anna is looking for her dog who did not come back after going to get the 
ball in the woods.  Encountering the story sentence, “Anna looked until it started to get 
dark.”, the reader might use his or her world knowledge to evaluate Anna's behaviour and 
surmise that she should not continue to look after dark because she could get lost and 
might make an evaluative comment to that effect (e.g., "Anna did the right thing to stop 
looking when it got dark [because she could have gotten lost too]").  
Inferencing is typically assessed through the use of comprehension questions 
following a story.  A child’s causal inferencing ability is generally assessed by asking 
'why' or 'how' questions (Laing & Kamhi, 2002).  Using the example given above, the 
question, “Why didn’t Anna’s dog come back?” could be asked to assess the reader’s 
causal inferencing.  Informational inferences are assessed by asking who, what, when, 
and where questions (Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  For the above example, the reader’s 
informational inferencing could be assessed using the question, “Where did Anna take 
her dog for a walk?”.  Evaluative inferences are assessed by asking questions such as 
“Was that a good thing [for the character] to do?” (van Kleeck, 2008).  Given the 
example from “Anna and Her Dog”, the question, “Was it a good thing for Anna to stop 
looking for her dog when it got dark?” could be asked to assess the reader’s evaluative 
inferencing ability. 
Importance of Causal Inferences to Comprehension 
Causal inferences have been cited as the most important type of inference for 
adequate text comprehension (Laing & Kamhi, 2002; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996a; van 
Kleeck, 2008).  Readers who consistently make connections between parts of the text as 




to retain causal information in working memory, thereby increasing the availability of 
this information when answering questions about the text after reading (Trabasso & 
Magliano, 1996b).  
The majority of inferences made by good comprehenders during reading or 
listening to a story are causal.  Poor comprehenders make significantly fewer causal 
inferences than good comprehenders while reading (Laing & Kamhi, 2002), as well as on 
listening tasks, suggesting that the results on the reading task could not be fully explained 
by poor reading fluency.  Cain et al. (2001) similarly found that children with poor 
reading comprehension responded to comprehension questions requiring causal 
inferences less accurately than good comprehenders, even when children understood the 
literal content of stories (as determined through assessment), and world knowledge was 
controlled for by ensuring all participants had similar knowledge at the outset.  This 
result suggests that content or background knowledge is also insufficient in explaining 
causal inferencing difficulties in poor comprehenders.  Furthermore, Cain and Oakhill 
(1999) found that causal inferences (along with text-to-text inferences) predicted variance 
in the reading comprehension of good and poor comprehenders, while measures of literal 
comprehension did not.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the ability to make 
causal inferences is related to the comprehension difficulties experienced by poor 
comprehenders and to the superior comprehension performance of good comprehenders 
(Laing & Kamhi, 2002).  
Inferencing in SLI   




with inferential than literal comprehension (Wright & Newhoff, 20011).  For children 
with SLI, this pattern has been shown on listening comprehension tasks (Botting & 
Adams, 2005; Norbury & Bishop, 2002; Wright & Newhoff, 2001), and even when 
stories contained familiar content (Norbury & Bishop, 2002), and vocabulary was at a 
level that all children could comprehend (Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  These results are 
consistent with those reviewed above for poor comprehenders, and suggest that the text 
comprehension difficulties experienced by children with SLI do not arise only because of 
problems with decoding, reading fluency, or inadequate world knowledge.  
Children with SLI also perform below their typically developing, chronological 
age-matched peers on both literal and inferential comprehension, even when the reading 
material is below grade level (Norbury & Bishop, 2002).  Performance on comprehension 
questions, asked after reading a text or listening to stories, is comparable to younger 
children who have been matched on some aspect of expressive and/or receptive language 
ability (Adams, Clarke, & Haynes, 2009; Bishop & Adams, 1992; Botting & Adams, 
2005; Norbury & Bishop, 2002; Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  The resemblance of children 
with SLI to younger, language-matched children on comprehension tasks can be 
interpreted in two ways: (1) the difficulties with comprehension arise because of 
difficulties with oral language, as the groups are matched on language ability, or (2) the 
comprehension difficulties reflect delays in cognitive development in the SLI group 
(Newton et al., 2010; Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  Given the debate as to how specific SLI 




inferencing is best considered an oral language skill, a cognitive skill, or a combination of 
both (Cain et al., 2001; Newton et al., 2010; van Kleeck, 2008), it is difficult to 
disentangle these explanations.  
 However, Newton et al. (2010) support a linguistic explanation for the inferencing 
difficulties observed in SLI.  In their study, children in an SLI group scored significantly 
lower on an inferencing task presented pictorially and verbally than a group of typically 
developing, age-matched controls, but performed similarly to a language-matched group.  
Scores on a receptive grammar measure contributed to the between-group differences, 
while measures of both working memory and cognitive ability did not.  Given that these 
results were obtained when the task was presented both orally and pictorially, the authors 
suggest that language mediates performance even on non-verbal inferencing tasks.  
 It has been documented that children with SLI have difficulty with text-to-world 
inferential comprehension.  However, the performance of children with an SLI profile 
(described by the authors as ‘language-learning disabled’) on comprehension questions in 
terms of inference type has been assessed in only one study (Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  
Consistent with the group differences observed for overall inference scores (alluded to in 
the preceding paragraph), the children with SLI performed significantly below the 
chronological age-matched group and at a similar level to the language-matched group on 
questions requiring informational and causal inferences (the authors refer to literal 
statements as "premises", informational inferences as "value inferences", and causal 
inferences as “logical inferences”).  All three groups performed significantly better on 
informational questions than on causal questions (Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  




suggests that inference types emerge at various points in development (Cain & Oakhill, 
1999).  Making a causal inference requires that the child (1) connect two premises in the 
text, and (2) incorporate his or her own world knowledge to create meaning.  The other 
forms of text-to-world inferences require that the child draw on his or her world 
knowledge to elaborate on or make sense of only one premise in the text.  Given the 
greater demands of making a causal inference, it is plausible that a child is only able to 
successfully make this type of inference later in development.  
In the studies reviewed thus far, both inferential and literal comprehension have 
typically been assessed by asking children comprehension questions after they read or 
listen to a story.  Another procedure has been used to reveal the inferences children make 
during reading: the think-aloud procedure. 
The Think-Aloud Procedure 
In a research context, a ‘think-aloud’ refers to individuals’ verbal reports of their 
thoughts as they enter and are processed in working memory, either during or 
immediately following a task (Crutcher, 1994).  Think-alouds have been used to 
investigate a wide range of cognitive processes, including the number and type of 
inferences children make during reading (Laing & Kamhi, 2002; Trabasso & Magliano, 
1996b).   Children read one sentence of a passage at a time and are instructed to verbalize 
whatever thoughts come to mind after reading each sentence.  Given that the child is not 
instructed to think about the process of reading or what his or her thoughts might mean, 
the verbalizations are thought to expose the information that the child is currently 
processing in working memory, and that is consciously available to him or her while 




The think-aloud procedure has revealed marked differences in the overall number 
of verbalizations made by good and poor adult readers (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & 
Glaser, 1989).  Moreover, adults who made many verbalizations during the procedure 
showed better comprehension for what they had read than adults who made few (Chi et 
al., 1989).  Trabasso and Magliano (1996b) extended the think-aloud procedure to 
children in third grade to investigate inferencing.  They found that 70% of verbalizations 
made by third graders while reading were inferences, but that the children made fewer 
causal inferences than adults.  Laing and Kamhi (2002) partially replicated the study and 
found that children characterized as poor comprehenders made significantly fewer causal 
inferences than good comprehenders during a think-aloud. 
Successful reading occurs when a reader has processed a text and has made 
specific and deliberate causal connections in order to make sense of the text (Kintsch, 
1988).  It is thought that readers who aim to make causal connections between parts of 
text by linking propositions are more likely to hold meaningful information in working 
memory, thereby enabling them to retrieve and use the information after reading to 
correctly answer comprehension questions or to recall text (Trabasso & Magliano, 
1996b).  That is, the causal inferences that good comprehenders make during reading 
contribute to their superior performance on comprehension questions and recall tasks, 
while the difficulty poor comprehenders appear to have in making this type of inference 
might similarly affect their performance on such tasks.  Information about the number 
and types of inferences a reader makes is critical in understanding a child’s reading 
difficulties.  This is information that can not be obtained through the use of off-line 




Although there are clear benefits to using a think-aloud procedure, there are three 
important limitations to be considered.  First, a child might think more about the text than 
he or she might normally due to task demands and prompting.  Second, there are 
increased demands placed on the child as he or she must simultaneously perform the task 
and report on it, thus breaking up the task of reading, however briefly.  Third, children 
with SLI may have difficulty expressing their thoughts.  Despite these limitations, it has 
been argued that the think-aloud procedure provides valuable and rich insight into a 
child’s reasoning process that can not be obtained through the use of comprehension 
questions alone (Phillips, 1988).  Additionally, previous research assessing the 
storytelling ability of adolescents with SLI (Wetherell, Botting, & Conti-Ramsden, 2007), 
and the comprehension of expository text of children with SLI, using a think-aloud 
procedure (Gillam, Fargo, & Robertson, 2009), suggests that children in upper 
elementary school (as in the present study) should be able to meaningfully express their 
ideas during a think-aloud procedure using narrative texts.  Moreover, the successful use 
of the protocol with poor comprehenders, all of whom were shown to have previously 
unidentified difficulties with oral language, (Laing & Kamhi, 2002), suggests that the 
results will be informative. 
The Present Study 
 The goals of the present study were to (a) compare the inferencing abilities of 
children with SLI and with typical language development (TLD), as assessed by offline 
comprehension questions, (b) to extend the research by investigating online inferencing 
of children with SLI using a think-aloud procedure, and (c) to determine whether a think-




and for age-matched peers with TLD.  
 A group of children with SLI and an age-matched group of children with typical 
language development (TLD) were compared on their responses to comprehension 
questions following stories read silently by each child and simultaneously heard over a 
speaker during an individual session (the read-through condition).  It was hypothesized 
that (1) children with SLI would perform below the TLD group on both literal and 
inferential questions (2) both groups would have greater difficulty with inferential than 
literal comprehension questions, and (3) both groups would have lower scores on 
questions requiring causal inferences than on questions requiring informational 
inferences.  
The second objective was to compare children with SLI to the TLD group in 
terms of the inferences they verbalized after simultaneously reading and listening to each 
sentence of a story (the think-aloud condition).  Based on the findings by Laing and 
Kamhi (2002) in a study conducted with good and poor comprehenders, the hypotheses 
were (1) the SLI group would make fewer and less accurate inferences than the TLD 
group and (2) the SLI group would make fewer causal inferences than the TLD group.  
 A third objective was to compare participants’ performance on inferential and 
literal comprehension questions across the two conditions (think-aloud and read-through).  
It was hypothesized that performance would be enhanced in the think-aloud condition for 
both the SLI and TLD groups.  Although the premise of the think-aloud procedure is that 
it will reveal what a participant is thinking, Laing and Kamhi’s (2002) results suggest that 
children might make more inferences in the think-aloud condition than they would 




 Finally, measures of oral language served to distinguish the SLI and TLD groups. 
The oral language scores, as well as scores on tests of nonverbal cognition, were 
additionally examined as correlates of children’s performance on the reading 
comprehension questions and the total number of causal inferences made during reading 
(that is, in the think-aloud condition). 
Method 
Research Design  
 The design is a 2 x 2 mixed model, in which the between-group factor was group 
(SLI or TLD), and the within-group factor was reading condition (read-through or think-
aloud).  Each participant in the SLI and TLD groups participated in the two reading 
conditions: read-through and think-aloud.  
Participants 
Pilot participants. As reported in the procedures below, the stories, 
comprehension questions, and the think-aloud procedure were piloted with adults and 
children in three phases.  Eight adults participated in phase 1 (M age in years and months 
= 29;8, SD = 2;1) and 12 adults (M age = 26;10, SD = 4;8) participated in phase 2.  All 
adults had a minimum of 2 years of university-level education.  Two children (one girl 
and one boy), aged 7;10 and 9;11 respectively, participated in phase 3 piloting.  All pilot 
participants were recruited from the community by word-of-mouth.  
 Study participants. Although ethical approval was obtained from the university 
and a local school board to recruit in the community and in local schools, this came at the 
end of the school year and entry to schools was not possible.  Therefore, participants 




through flyers posted in local settings frequented by children and families (e.g., public 
libraries), word of mouth, and letters and flyer distribution to local speech-language 
pathologists.  Four participants, all within the TLD group, were recruited from the 
community; attempts to recruit children with language impairment were unsuccessful.  In 
the fall of 2011, 23 participants were recruited from local elementary schools with the 
assistance of classroom teachers, who sent information letters and consent forms home to 
parents in the students’ agendas (the usual form of communication between teachers and 
parents), in keeping with the processes recommended by the university and school board 
ethics committees.  
Participants recruited for the SLI group were 13 upper elementary students who 
had been identified as having a mixed (expressive and receptive) language impairment by 
speech-language pathologists and were regularly receiving speech-language services.  For 
11 of the 12 participants, the impairment was severe, according to criteria set by the 
provincial Ministry of Education [Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport] 
(Gouvernement du Québec, 2007).  Eight boys and 5 girls were originally recruited.  One 
female participant was dropped due to factors compromising the validity of language test 
scores (i.e., English as a second language with no English spoken at home).  The final 
sample was comprised of 12 participants (M age = 10;5, SD = 0;8), including 8 boys (M 
age = 10;6, SD = 0;7) and 4 girls (M age = 10;3, SD = 0;11).  A greater proportion of 
boys than girls participated in the study.  This was anticipated given the distribution of 
boys and girls with language impairment found on clinical caseloads, as well as research 
findings of a greater prevalence of SLI among boys (Rice, 2009).  The participants in the 




receiving educational instruction in English, and reported speaking English the majority 
of the time at home.  All, however, had some exposure to a second or a third language, 
either at school through second language instruction, or in their community or home.   
Sixteen students with typical language development, identified by teachers and 
parents as having average or above average language and reading ability were recruited 
for the TLD group.  Further inclusion criteria were that the participant had not repeated a 
year in school, and received English instruction in school at least 50% of the time (it is 
not uncommon for English-speaking children in the province to be enrolled in French 
immersion education at least half-time).  As in the SLI group, all participants reported 
speaking English the majority of the time at home with some exposure to a second or 
third language.  Testing was discontinued after the first session for two participants: one 
boy who had previously repeated a year of school, and one girl who had only recently 
immigrated to Canada.  A further two participants recruited for the TLD group were 
dropped from the sample: one boy whose standard scores were one standard deviation or 
more below the mean on all standardized measures, and one girl who performed below 
one standard deviation on the language test.  The final sample size was 12 (M age = 10;3, 
SD = 0;6) with 8 boys (M age = 10;4, SD = 0;6) and 4 girls (M age = 10;2, SD = 0;7) in 
the TLD group.  
Although the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-3 (TONI-3) was not used as a 
screening measure for group inclusion, it was used to rule out intellectual impairment for 
both groups.  The mean scores for both groups were within average range (within one 
standard deviation of the mean) and not significantly different between groups.  It should 




as did five participants in the TLD group.  In the SLI group, two of the four participants 
who scored below 85 scored within one standard error of measurement (80 to 84), one of 
the participants scored within two standard errors of measurement (75 to 79), and one 
participant scored within three standard errors of measurement (70 to 74).  These 
participants were kept in the sample, given that each child had a diagnosis of language 
impairment prior to the present study that excluded intellectual impairment based on 
more extensive testing.  Five participants in the TLD group had a score between 80 and 
84, within one standard error of measurement of a standard score of 85.  Lower scores 
may have, in some cases, reflected test anxiety, particularly for children in the TLD 
group who may have had less experience with formal testing, and especially as the 
TONI-3 was the first measure to be administered in the first session (see procedures 
regarding task order).  
Measures and Apparatus 
The following measures and apparatus were used to assess students’ oral 
language, nonverbal cognitive ability, nonverbal working memory, and reading 
comprehension and inferencing ability. 
Apparatus. All tests requiring verbal responses from the participants were audio 
recorded using a Panasonic RR-US-570 digital recorder.  All story stimuli were pre-
recorded into mp3 files and saved onto an iPod Touch mp3 player.  A portable X-Mini II 
capsule speaker was used during testing to play the story recordings to the participants. 
 Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-Fourth Edition. The CELF-4 
(Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003) is a standardized, norm-referenced test designed to assess 




reliability and validity and is also one of the most frequently used measures used by 
clinicians to diagnose SLI (Eickhoff, Betz, & Ristow, 2010).  The standardization sample 
consisted of 2,650 students, and was representative of the 2000 U.S. population for age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, socio-economic status (based on education level of the primary 
parent), geographic location, and prevalence of developmental disabilities (language-
based or other).  For composite scores, internal consistency (measured using Cronbach’s 
alpha) was between .87 and .95 and split-half reliability ranged from .87 to .95.  Inter-
scorer agreement for subtests ranged from .88 to .99.  The CELF-4 also has high 
sensitivity and specificity, which is important when making diagnoses of language 
impairments and, for the purpose of the present study, to identify children as having 
typical language development or a language impairment.  
The Receptive and Expressive Language subscales were administered to assess 
each student’s oral language ability.  The Receptive Language subscale includes two 
tasks: Concepts and Following Directions, where the child is asked to point to pictures 
that correspond to instructions varying in length and complexity, and including different 
concepts (for example, spatial and temporal concepts) and Word Classes-Receptive, 
where the child listens to four words and is asked to choose two semantically-related 
words.  The Expressive Language subscale is made up of three tasks: Recalling 
Sentences, in which the child is asked to repeat verbatim a sentence that is read by the 
examiner; Formulated Sentences, in which the child is told a word and is asked to make 
up a sentence that is contextually relevant to a picture; and Word Classes-Expressive, in 
which the child must explain how two words are related in meaning.  The Receptive and 




Language and Language Memory composites (referred to as indices by the test authors). 
Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-3.  The TONI-3 (Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 
1997) is a standardized, norm-referenced measure of nonverbal reasoning and problem-
solving ability that can be used with individuals between the ages of 5 and 86 years.  The 
TONI-3 was normed on a sample of 3,451 children and adults in the U.S. in 1995 and 
1996.  The sample was representative of the U.S. population in terms of geographic 
region, gender, race, urban/rural residence, ethnicity, socio-economic status (based on 
family income and level of educational attainment of adult participants and parents of 
minor participants), and identified disability.  
The TONI-3 consists of two highly correlated, parallel forms (forms A and B).  
Alternate forms reliability for children aged 9 to 11 years is between .79 and .85.  
Interscorer reliability for the TONI-3 was .99.  Test-retest reliability, completed for 
participants aged 13 years and older, was greater than .89 for both forms.  According to 
the test authors (Brown et al., 1997), TONI-3 scores correlate with the overall nonverbal 
IQ on the CTONI (Hammill, Pearson, & Wiederholt, 1996; as cited in Brown et al., 
1997), r = .76 and .74 for Forms A and B, respectively; the full scale IQ of the WISC-3 
(Wechsler, 1991; as cited in Brown et al., 1997) r = .63 for both forms; and the full scale 
IQ on the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981; as cited in Brown et al., 1997), r = .73 and .71 for 
Forms A and B, respectively.  
Data provided by the authors as evidence of construct validity includes 
differences in nonverbal cognitive ability at different ages (correlation coefficients of .63 
for Form A and .60 for Form B, between 6 and 18 years of age), correlation of scores 




between the ages of 8 and 16 years, as well as an average correlation of .59 with several 
measures of achievement), and differences in scores between groups known to display 
differences in nonverbal cognitive ability (Brown et al., 1997). 
Each form contains 50 items, arranged in order of difficulty.  Each item consists 
of a matrix of symbols in which one symbol is missing (See Appendix B for sample 
item).  For each item, the displayed and missing symbols are constrained by a specific 
relationship (e.g., matching, analogous, additive, progressive).  The examiner administers 
the test demonstration items nonverbally (with a pointing and questioning gesture), and 
the participant responds by pointing to one of 4 or 6 options that would best complete the 
matrix.  A ceiling is reached, and testing is ended, when the participant makes three 
errors out of five consecutive items.  As oral language is not required to conduct the test, 
the TONI is recommended for use with language-impaired individuals (McGhee & 
Lieberman, 1990).  
Working Memory Test Battery for Children.  The Working Memory Test 
Battery for Children (WMTB-C) (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001) is a standardized, norm-
referenced measure for children aged 5 to 15 years that comprises nine subtests of verbal 
and nonverbal working memory.  The WMTB-C was standardized on a sample of 729 
British children (included 98 students with special educational needs) aged 4;7 to 15;9 
years old, selected from schools in both rural and urban settings.  
Two nonverbal tests of working memory, the Block Recall and Mazes Memory 
subtests, were selected for use in the present study.  These subtests are highly correlated 
with WMTB-C verbal working memory tasks of Counting Recall (r = .60 and .65, 




tasks avoid the confound of oral language believed to negatively affect the performance 
of children with SLI (Montgomery, Magimairai, & Finney, 2010), and children with 
reading difficulties (Savage, Lavers, & Pillay, 2007) on verbal working memory tasks.  
Test-retest reliability for the Block Recall and Mazes Memory tasks, for children aged 
9;7 to 11;4 years, was .43 and .53, respectively.  The Block Recall and Mazes Memory 
subtests were significantly but not highly correlated with one another (r = .30).  The test 
authors considered inter-rater reliability unnecessary for either the Block Recall or the 
Mazes Memory tasks, as there was no subjective decision-making necessary with regards 
to an item being correct or incorrect on either subtest. 
In the Block Recall task, the experimenter taps a series of blocks, after which the 
child is required to repeat the sequence.  In the Mazes Memory task, the participant 
watches as the examiner traces a path through a maze with her finger.  The participant is 
then asked to draw the same path on an identical maze in a test booklet.  Both tasks 
increase in complexity as the participant correctly replicates the demonstrated items, and 
testing is stopped when the participant makes three errors out of a block of six trials.  
Standard scores for both the Block Recall and Mazes Memory subtests were obtained.  
Experimental stories and reading comprehension questions.  
Picture stories.  Two picture stories, adapted from McKeough et al. (1996), 
served to measure children's volubility on an oral narrative task - a task that was 
considered to be similar, yet less demanding, than the think-aloud task.  The storytelling 
also served as a warm-up activity before beginning the reading activities.  Each story 
consisted of a sequence of five simple, black and white line drawings.  One story 




young girl hitting a home run during a baseball game (see Appendix C for picture 
stories).  
Think-aloud demonstration stories.  One demonstration story (Rachel and the 
Giant, 51 words) was adapted from Trabasso and Magliano (1996a) with permission (J. 
Magliano, personal communication, January 12, 2011).  A second demonstration story 
(Ivan and the Dragon, 55 words) was written by the researcher to parallel the first story 
(see Appendix D).  Stories were written at a second and third grade level respectively, as 
measured by the Spache Readability Formula, which takes into account the difficulty of 
words used and average number of words per sentence (Spache, 1953).  Participants read 
the story from a printed copy in front of him or her and simultaneously listened to audio 
recordings of the stories, told at a normal speaking rate and played over a speaker at a 
conversational volume.  Demonstration story themes were fantastical in nature (a young 
girl scaring a giant away from her town, and a young boy befriending a dragon), which 
contrasted with the realistic nature of the experimental stories so as to minimize 
carryover effects from the demonstrations to the children’s own think-alouds. 
Experimental stories.  Four stories, one from Bishop and Adams (1992) adapted 
with permission (D. Bishop, personal communication, December 23, 2010), and three 
written by the experimenter (see Appendix A), were presented to each participant to 
measure story comprehension and inferencing.  Stories were audio recorded at a normal 
speaking rate and regular conversational volume to maintain consistency during testing.  
The stories ranged in length from 108 to 114 words long and were intentionally written at 
a readability level below the participants’ grade levels to avoid the potential effects of 




primary interest.  According to the Spache Readability Formula, the stories were at a 
second grade level (Spache, 1953). 
Story themes were selected to ensure that the story content would likely be 
familiar to all students.  Two of the stories centered on the protagonist’s goal of making 
something (a go-cart and a birthday cake), while the other two stories centered on the 
protagonist experiencing a difficult event (falling through the ice while skating and 
attempting to find a lost dog).  
Comprehension questions.  A set of nine comprehension questions was written 
for each story.  Each set included three literal, three causal inferencing, and three 
informational inferencing questions.  Literal questions were based on information that 
was stated explicitly within the text.  Inferential questions were broken down into two 
categories: informational and causal.  Informational questions required that the 
participant use his or her world knowledge to expand on a single, explicitly stated 
proposition, while causal questions required that the participant use his or her world 
knowledge to identify information that was implicitly stated in the text in order to 
connect two explicitly stated propositions.  
Procedure  
Stage 1 piloting.  The experimental stories and comprehension questions were 
piloted in the read-through condition with eight adult participants.  Piloting took place 
individually, in either a quiet room at Concordia University or in the participant’s home.  
The researcher read all four stories out loud while the participants silently read a printed 
version of the story.  Each story was immediately followed by a set of comprehension 




through the session.  Before reading each story, the following instructions were given: 
“Now we are going to read a story.  I am going to read it out loud, and you will read 
along in your head.  Then, I am going to ask you some questions about the story, so do 
your best to understand it while we’re reading.”  After reading the story, the participants 
were told, “Now I am going to ask you some questions about the story.  It’s okay to guess 
at the answers.”  The printed story was moved out of the participant’s view during the 
question period.  If no response was given, or participants indicated that they either could 
not recall or that the requested information was not presented in the text, the prompt, “Do 
you want to guess?” was used.  Participant feedback about inconsistencies or areas of 
difficulty in the stories and comprehension questions was used to make adjustments to 
the stimuli, and responses to the comprehension questions were used to develop a 
comprehension question scoring key. 
Stage 2 piloting.  Once all adjustments had been made to the stories and 
comprehension questions, the read-through and think-aloud conditions were piloted with 
12 adult participants.  For the read-through, the Stage 1 piloting procedures were 
replicated.  Additionally, stories were counterbalanced across condition, but order of 
condition alternated and was kept constant (for each participant, each session began with 
a story in the read-through condition, followed by a story in the think-aloud condition, 
and so on).  
Before reading the first think-aloud story, the researcher provided the participant 
with a scripted demonstration using the “Ivan and the Giant” story (later modified to 
“Rachel and the Giant” to avoid gender stereotypes; see Appendix E for demonstration 




given before the second story in the think-aloud condition.  Before both think-aloud 
stories, participants were instructed, “Now we are going to read another story.  This time 
we are going to do something a little different.  We are going to read the story one 
sentence at a time.  I will read the story out loud, and you will follow along in your head.  
After each sentence, I will give you a thumbs-up, and you will explain what you 
understand about the story.”  Before the first think-aloud story, participants were further 
instructed, “First, I’ll show you how to do it, and then it will be your turn.”  Following 
the demonstration, the instructions were repeated.  As in the read-through condition, 
participants were told that they would be asked questions about the story once they had 
read it, and to do their best to understand the story.  
In both conditions, stories were presented to participants printed one sentence per 
line, double-spaced, on an 8.5 x 11” piece of white paper.  In the think-aloud condition, 
only one sentence of the story was visible to the participants at a time while they were 
explaining their understanding of the story.  The rest of the story was covered up using a 
piece of white paper.  Participant responses during the think-aloud procedure were audio-
recorded for later transcription.  As in the read-through condition, the story was placed 
out of the participants’ sight during the question period.  Participants were once again 
told that they would now be asked some questions about the story, and that it was okay to 
guess at the answers.  
Participant responses to comprehension questions were used to further modify the 
comprehension question scoring key, and statements made in the think-aloud conditions 
were used to develop a think-aloud scoring system.  




written by the researcher (Ivan and the Dragon; see Appendix D).  The final 
demonstration and experimental stories were printed, one sentence per page, in a story 
stimulus book (see Appendix F for example).  All stories were audio-recorded by the 
researcher into mp3 files, and played over a speaker during testing.  These stimuli were 
piloted in both the read-through and think-aloud conditions with two children.  As in the 
stage 2 piloting, participants read all four stories (two stories in each condition) and 
answered corresponding comprehension questions in a single session.  A break was taken 
after reading the first two stories, in which the researcher engaged in a short origami 
airplane activity with the participants.  The testing procedure in this stage of piloting was 
identical to the Stage 2 Piloting procedure.  The second think-aloud demonstration story, 
Ivan and the Dragon, was piloted with one of the participants, whereas the Rachel and the 
Giant demonstration story (see Appendix E for demonstration story scripts), was piloted 
with the other participant.  
Study testing.  Individual testing was conducted in a quiet area outside of the 
classroom or in the participant’s home.  Test sessions were, on average, three days apart 
(range 1-7 days) and each lasted approximately one hour.  Participants were tested in 
both sessions by one of two examiners, either the researcher or a trained research 
assistant.  Instructions for experimental tasks were scripted to maintain consistency 
across examiners (see Appendix G for test prompts), and standardized procedures were 
followed for the norm-referenced measures.  Tasks requiring verbal responses were 
audio-recorded for later review.  During administration of nonverbal measures, responses 
were scored by hand during the session on scoresheets provided with the tests, and the 




Verbal and nonverbal measures were distributed across the two sessions to 
minimize fatigue or boredom of participants.  Order of test administration was kept 
constant for all participants within test sessions.  Administration of the story measures 
was identical to the testing procedures in Stage 3 Piloting, with one story in each 
condition, for a total of two stories read per session.  The four stories were 
counterbalanced across the think-aloud and read-through conditions for both groups, to 
ensure that each story was read the same number of times in each condition for both 
groups. 
At the start of each session, the examiner read an assent script (see Appendix G), 
and verbal assent was obtained from the participant.  Session 1 began with the TONI-3, 
followed by the biking picture story narrative, a story in the read-through condition, the 
Rachel and the Giant think-aloud demonstration, and a story in the think-aloud condition.  
After administering the reading measures, the participants were given a short break in 
which they made colourful paper airplanes from an origami airplane kit, followed by 
administration of the Word Classes-2 and Recalling Sentences subtests of the CELF-4.  
Session 2 began with the Block Recall, and then the Mazes Memory subtests of the 
WMTB-C.  Administration of the reading measures began with the baseball picture story 
narrative, followed by the Ivan and the Dragon demonstration story, a story in the think-
aloud condition, and a story in the read-through condition.  Following administration of 
the story measures, the participant was given a short break in which they made a second 
origami airplane.  After the break, the Concepts and Following Directions and 
Formulated Sentences subtests of the CELF-4 were administered.  Participants were 




during their break.  Gifts were not thought to be appropriate in the school setting, as not 
all students in the classrooms from which participants were recruited were selected to 
participate, as some had not returned signed consent forms, and others did not meet 
inclusion criteria for the study.  
Scoring  
Standardized measures.  Standard scores were obtained for the TONI-3, the 
Core Language2, Receptive Language, Expressive Language, and Language Memory 
composites of the CELF-4, and the Block Recall and Mazes Memory subtests of the 
WMTB-C.  
Picture story scoring.  Student’s picture story narratives were scored by a 
research assistant.  The total number of independent clauses provided in each narrative 
were counted from the audio recording (ignoring reformulations and utterances that 
trailed off).  
Comprehension question scoring.  Students’ responses to comprehension 
questions were scored according to a 3-point scoring system adapted from Bishop and 
Adams (1992).  Two points were awarded for a correct response, 1 point was awarded for 
a response that was correct but that omitted an important detail, and 0 points were 
awarded for no response or responses that were incorrect (See Appendix H for 
Experimental story scoring keys).  The maximum total score that could be obtained was 
18 (9 questions per story x 2 points maximum) and the minimum was 0.  Two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 One participant in the current study was 8 years, 11 months. For children of this age, the Core Language 
composite excludes one of the subtests (Word Classes, on which standard scores can nonetheless be 
calculated for individuals between 5 and 8 years) that form the composite for individuals aged 9 years or 
more, replacing it with Word Structure.  Given that the Word Classes and Word Structure subtests tests are 
not equivalent, and for the sake of consistency with other participants, the Core Language composite for 




adjustments were made after reviewing the comprehension questions during scoring: one 
literal question in the story “Andrew goes Skating” was re-categorized as informational, 
and one informational question in “Gabby and the Stroller” was removed, as the wording 
may have led to some confusion in the children’s responses.  These adjustments did not 
change the analyses, in that the planned proportional scores (total points in a 
category/total possible points in that category * 100) could still be calculated.   
The researcher scored 100% (n = 96) of all comprehension questions.  A research 
assistant, blind to group and purpose of the study, scored 33% (n = 32) of the questions.  
The 32 questions were selected randomly from a set that equally represented the groups 
and were drawn equally from the four stories.  Interscorer reliability was 94.61% 
(weighted kappa = .91).  
Think-aloud transcription and scoring.  To analyze the inferences the children 
made during the think-aloud procedure, each child’s statements during the think-aloud 
condition were transcribed into Microsoft Word files by the researcher (see Appendix I 
for a sample transcription).  Think-aloud statements were segmented into clauses that 
expressed a main idea, which was generally indicated by the presence of a main verb (see 
Appendix J for segmenting rules).  Segmenting rules were devised to ensure that 
statements encompassed a main idea while allowing for natural variations in spoken 
language, such as ellipses and omissions.  Once transcribed, think-aloud statements were 
categorized as literal or inferential.  Literal statements consisted of full and partial 
repetitions and paraphrases of the current story sentence.  Inferential statements were 
further categorized as causal, informational, or evaluative.  If semantic, phonological, 




inferential, it was coded as uninterpretable. 
Given that a single story sentence could generate an infinite number or a ‘chain’ 
of statements, either relating directly to the current story sentence, to a previously read 
story sentence, or to the participant’s preceding think-aloud statements, a coding 
sequence was integrated to the scoring procedure (see Appendix K) to ensure that codes 
were systematically assigned to statements.  Using the scoring procedure, the coder 
categorized each think-aloud statement as literal, causal, informational, evaluative, or 
uninterpretable.  If the statement was either a full or partial literal repetition or paraphrase 
of the current story sentence, it was coded as literal.  If the statement was not a literal 
statement or if it contained added information, the coder moved on to consider whether 
the statement communicated cause or effect in relation to the current story sentence, a 
preceding story sentence, or a previous statement.  If the statement did not fit the causal 
category, the coder moved on to the informational category.  If the statement answered 
‘what, how, who, where, when’ questions about either the current story sentence, a 
preceding story sentence, or a previous statement, it was coded as informational.  If the 
think-aloud statement could not be coded as informational, the coder then considered the 
final inferential category, evaluation.  If the statement was used by the reader to judge or 
evaluate a state, event, action, or object described by the focal sentence or a previous 
statement based on the reader’s world knowledge, social conventions, or personal values, 
it was coded as evaluative.  Finally, if the coder could not interpret the statement due to 
semantic, phonological, and/or syntactic errors, the statement was coded as 
‘uninterpretable’.   




point scoring system (0, 1, or 2 points).  Literal statements were scored 2 points if they 
were an exact repetition of the focal sentence or a close paraphrase; 1 point if they were 
partially correct but included grammatical or semantic errors that led to a significant 
change in meaning or rendered part of the statement ambiguous; and 0 points if the 
statements were incorrect or did not make sense.  A 3-point system was also used to score 
inferential statements.  An inferential statement was scored 2 points if it was relevant and 
logically linked to the text or to a previous statement, and made sense given the context 
of the story; 1 point if the statement was relevant but an important piece of information 
was omitted that led to a change in meaning, or if the statement was inaccurate but still 
related to the story; 0 points if the statement seemed outlandish or nonsensical given the 
information provided in the story.  The minimum total score possible was 0 but there was 
no maximum, as an infinite number of statements could be generated by participants and 
scored.  Statements coded as uninterpretable were not given a score, and were excluded 
from analyses. 
The total number of literal, causal, and informational statements produced during 
the think-aloud procedure was calculated.  Additionally, the number of causal statements 
that were scored 1 point and 0 points were calculated as a proportion of the total number 
of statements in that category (i.e., (number of causal statements scored 1 point / total 
number of causal statements) * 100) to allow for between-group comparisons of 
statement accuracy.  
The researcher scored 100% (n = 48) of the think-aloud transcriptions.  To 
calculate interscorer reliability, a trained research assistant who was blind to group scored 




that equally represented the groups and the four stories.  Interscorer reliability of 85.44% 
(kappa = .72) was obtained for statement coding.  Reliability was established for only the 
literal, causal, and informational categories; there were too few instances of the 
evaluative codes overall to gather meaningful reliability data and moreover, the category 
was not further analyzed here.   
For the assignment of points to the statements, reliability was 92.90% (weighted 
kappa = .31, SE = .09) (weighted kappa is appropriate for ordinal scores).  Given the 
large discrepancy between the % agreement and the kappa value, disagreements between 
coders were reviewed by the research supervisor and researcher.  Most disagreements 
reflected a tendency for the second coder - the trained assistant - to attribute 2 points to 1 
point responses, an issue returned to in the discussion.  
Results 
 Normality tests.  The Shapiro-Wilks test was used to examine normality for all 
variables, and the results were additionally considered in light of visual inspection of 
scatterplots and histograms.  When these tests indicated violation of the normality 
assumption, scores were transformed using transformations (consistently, square root).  
When violations of normality remained despite the transformations, nonparametric 
statistical tests were used: the Mann-Whitney U to assess between-group differences and 
the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks to assess within-group differences (there is no non-
parametric equivalent to a repeated measures ANOVA with a between-group factor, 
though such an analysis would have been ideal given the study design). 
 Age.  The children ranged in age from 8;11 to 11;3.  The mean age of the SLI 




= 0;6).  An independent t-test showed that the mean group ages were not significantly 
different, t(22) = -.562, p = .580.   
Language measure (CELF-4).  Scores on the subtests of the CELF-4 (described 
in the Method) can be combined to yield various composite standard scores: a Receptive 
Language score, an Expressive Language score, a Core Language Score comprised of the 
Receptive and Expressive scores, and a Language Memory score entailing all but one of 
the subtests involved in the Core Language score.  These scores are reported in Table 1 
for descriptive purposes, along with standard scores for all measures.  Given that the Core 
Language and Receptive Language scores were not normally distributed, they were 
transformed using a square root transformation.  Independent t-tests were conducted on 
the transformed scores for these variables.  The SLI group performed significantly below 
the TLD group on each of these composites: Receptive Language (SLI M = 8.38, SD = 
.35; TLD M = 9.99, SD = .87), t(22) = 5.965, p < .001; Expressive Language (SLI M = 
63.83, SD = 6.85; TLD M = 110.83, SD = 14.84), t(22) = 9.960, p < .001; Core Language 
(SLI M = 7.79, SD = .48; TLD M = 10.23, SD = .70), t(22) = 10.005, p < .001; and 
Language Memory (SLI M = 57.17, SD = 6.67; TLD M = 101.92, SD = 14.48), t(22) = 
9.726, p < .001.  
Non-verbal measures (WMTB-C and TONI-3).  For the Mazes Memory 
subtest of the WMTB-C, the performance of the two groups was not significantly 
different (SLI M = 94.33, SD = 16.73), t(22) = .51, p = .62.  However, the SLI group (M 
= 81.25, SD = 16.73) performed significantly below the TLD group (M = 96.67, SD = 
16.73) on the Block Recall subtest, t(22) = 2.26, p = .035.  




between groups, U = 61.50, z = -.61, p = .54.  The untransformed standard scores are 
displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Language and Nonverbal Measures, by Group 
 SLI Group 
(n = 12) 
TLD Group  
(n = 12) 
 M SD M SD 
Measure     
CELF-4: Receptive Language 70.25 5.79 100.58 18.12 
CELF-4: Expressive Language 63.83 6.85 110.83 14.84 
CELF-4: Core Language 60.92 7.40 107.42 19.37 
CELF-4: Language Memory 57.17 6.67 101.92 14.48 
WMTB-C: Block Recall 81.25 16.73 96.67 16.73 
WMTB-C: Mazes Memory 94.33 18.79 98.42 20.76 
TONI-3 89.67 11.99 96.08 17.90 
Note. Standard scores reported with a population mean of 100, SD =15. 
Picture stories. The number of independent clauses made by the TLD group in 
the picture story narratives was not normally distributed. Mann-Whitney U tests were 
conducted to analyze the number of independent clauses produced during picture story 
narratives for both stories individually.  The alpha level was adjusted for multiple 
comparisons: Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025 (.05/2 comparisons).  Results were not 
significant for the first narrative, U = 40.50, z = -1.89, p = .029 (one-tailed), nor for the 
second narrative, U = 72.00, z = .000, p = .500 (one-tailed). 
Comprehension questions.  Four comprehension question variables were not 




and the total scores in both conditions).  While the remaining comprehension question 
variables were normally distributed, non-parametric tests were used to allow for 
comparison of results across question type: Mann-Whitney U tests for between-group 
comparisons, and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tested for within-group comparisons.  
Hypothesis 1: The SLI group will perform below the TLD group on literal and 
inferential (causal and informational) questions.  Figure 1 shows the comprehension 
question scores, expressed as a percentage of the total possible points, by group and 
question type in the read-through condition.  Figure 2 displays the same results for the 
think-aloud condition.  The figures show that scores were in the expected direction in 
both conditions: the scores of the SLI group on literal, informational, and causal 
questions appear lower than the scores of the TLD group.  Given, however, the non-
normal distribution of the variables, nonparametric statistics were used to compare the 
data. 
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests was conducted to test the hypotheses that the 
SLI group would perform below the TLD group on literal, informational, and causal 
questions.  The alpha level was adjusted for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha = .017 (.05/3 comparisons per condition).  The results were significant for all three 
question types in both the read-through and think-aloud conditions.  In the read-through 
condition, the scores of the SLI group were significantly below the TLD scores on literal 
questions, U = 16.00, z = -3.26, p = .001 (one-tailed); informational questions, U = 
22.50, z = -2.87, p = .003 (one-tailed); and causal questions, U = 8.50, z = -3.71, p < .01 
(one-tailed).  In the think-aloud condition, scores of the SLI group were significantly 




tailed); informational questions, U = 9.50, z = -3.63, p < .01 (one-tailed); and causal 
questions, U = 14.50, z = -3.36, p < .01 (one-tailed).  
 
Figure 1. Comprehension question scores (percent of total possible points) for all 




Figure 2. Comprehension question scores (percent of total possible points) for all 
question types by group in the think-aloud condition 
 




























































literal questions.  Figure 3 displays the literal, informational, causal, and total 
comprehension scores (expressed as a percentage of the total possible points), by group 
and by condition.  The figure shows that scores were in the expected direction; scores on 
inferential questions (both informational and causal) appear lower than scores on literal 
questions.  
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests were used to test the hypothesis that both groups 
would have greater difficulty with inferential than literal questions.  Scores on literal 
questions were compared to informational and causal questions.  A Bonferroni-adjusted 
alpha of .017 (.05/3) was again applied.  In the read-through condition, the results for the 
SLI group were significant for the literal-causal comparison, z = -2.19, p = .014 (one-
tailed), but not significant for the literal-informational comparison, z = -1.73, p = .042 
(one-tailed).  For the TLD group, the literal-causal comparison was not significant, z = -
.94, p = .17 (one-tailed), nor was the literal-informational comparison, z = -.09, p = .47 
(one-tailed).  In the think-aloud condition, results for the SLI group were non significant 
for both comparisons: literal-causal, z = -1.45, p = .073 (one-tailed); and literal-
informational, z = -2.04, p = .021 (one-tailed).  For the TLD group, results were also non 
significant: literal-causal, z = -1.17, p = .12 (one-tailed); and literal-informational, z = -
.59, p = .26 (one-tailed). 
 Hypothesis 3: Both groups will have lower scores on questions requiring causal 
inferences than on questions requiring informational inferences.  As can also be seen 
in Figure 3, the scores on causal questions appear to be slightly lower than scores on 
informational questions for both groups in the read-through condition, and for the TLD 




think-aloud condition, where scores on causal questions appear higher than scores on 
informational questions.  
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (Bonferroni adjustment, ! = .05/3 = .017) were 
conducted to test the hypothesis that both groups would have lower scores on questions 
requiring causal inferences than on those requiring informational inferences.  In the read-
through condition, the comparison was non significant for both the SLI group, z = -.13, p 
= .45 (one-tailed), and the TLD group, z = -.31, p = .38 (one-tailed).  In the think-aloud 
condition, the results were non significant for both the SLI group, z = -1.49, p = .068 
(one-tailed), and the TLD group, z = -.62, p = .27 (one-tailed).  
 Hypothesis 4: Performance of both groups on comprehension questions will be 
enhanced in the think-aloud condition.  Figure 3 shows that scores on all question types, 
as well as the overall comprehension scores, were in the expected direction for both 
groups; scores were higher in the think-aloud than in the read-through condition.  
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (Bonferroni adjustment ! = .05/4 = .013) were used 
to test the hypothesis that the performance of both the SLI and TLD groups would 
improve significantly in the think-aloud condition.  For total comprehension scores, 
results were nearing significance for the SLI group, z = -2.19, p = .014 (one-tailed).  
Results were significant for the TLD group, z = -2.59, p = .005 (one-tailed).  
Comprehension scores were further analyzed by question type to test for within–
group differences across condition.  For the SLI group, there was no significant 
difference between conditions for literal, z = -1.81, p = .036 (one-tailed), or informational 
z = 1.10, p = .14 (one-tailed) questions.  There was, however, a significant difference for 




(one-tailed).  For the TLD group, there was no significant difference between conditions 
for any of the question types: literal, z = -.95, p = .17, informational, z = -1.86, p = .032, 
and causal, z = -1.06, p = .15.  
 
 
Figure 3. Comprehension question scores (percent of total possible points) for all 
question types by group in both the read-through and think-aloud conditions 
 
Think-aloud Statements. 
  Hypotheses 1 & 2: The think-aloud statements of the SLI group will comprise 
(1) fewer informational inferences and (2) fewer causal inferences than the statements 
of the TLD group.  Given that the think-aloud statements were normally distributed, 
independent t-tests were conducted (Bonferroni adjustment, ! = .05/3 = .017) to test the 
hypotheses that the SLI group would make fewer informational and fewer causal 
inferences than the TLD group.  Results were in the expected direction, and were 
significant.  The SLI group made significantly fewer informational inferences, t(22) = 
2.32, p = .015 (one-tailed), and significantly fewer causal inferences, t(15.2) = 3.09, t = 




























A third independent t-test was conducted to explore the possibility that the results 
for inferences simply reflected a tendency for the SLI group to speak less than the TLD 
group.  The numbers of literal statements made by the SLI and TLD group were 
compared, under the assumption that differences in volubility, if any, should be reflected 
in literal statements.  The SLI group did not make significantly fewer literal statements, 
t(22) = -1.063, p = .15 (one-tailed).  These results suggest that the fewer inferences made 
by the SLI group were not solely the result of the SLI group speaking less than the TLD 
group.  
 Hypothesis 3: The SLI group will make less accurate causal inferences than the 
TLD group in the think-aloud condition.  Mann-Whitney U tests (Bonferroni 
adjustment, ! = .05/2 = .025) were conducted to test the hypothesis that the SLI group 
would make less accurate causal inferences than the TLD group, as indicated by a greater 
proportion of statements scored as 1 or 0 points (considered “inaccurate”, or 
“outlandish”, respectively), out of a possible 2 points for each statement. Results were in 
the expected direction, and were significant for causal inferences scored 1 point, U = 
24.00, z = -2.88, p = .003 (one-tailed), and causal inferences scored 0 points, U = 36.00, z 
= -2.73, p = .003 (one-tailed).    
Correlations of causal inferencing. To explore the relationship between 
language, nonverbal intelligence, working memory, and causal inferencing, Pearson 
correlations were conducted on composite scores of the CELF-4 (Receptive Language, 
Expressive Language, And Language Memory), TONI-3 scores, scores on the WMTB-C 
subtests (Mazes Memory and Block Recall), scores on causal comprehension questions in 




the think-aloud.  As is shown in Table 2, the CELF-4 composite scores were all 
significantly and highly correlated with scores on the causal comprehension questions in 
the read-through and think-aloud conditions.  The Expressive Language composite scores 
of the CELF-4 were significantly and moderately correlated with causal think-aloud 




Pearson Correlations Among Verbal and Nonverbal Measures, Causal Question 
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Note. The CELF-4 composite scores were all highly correlated in the study sample, as 
they were for the normative sample (Semel et al., 2003); these intercorrelations are not 
relevant to the present study.  Rec = Receptive; Exp = Expressive; Qs = Questions; RT = 
Read-through; TA = Think-aloud. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Scores on the Block Recall subtest of the WMTB-C were nearing significance 




significant in the think-aloud condition.  The Block Recall scores were significantly 
correlated with causal think-aloud statements.  Scores on the Mazes Memory subtest 
were not significantly correlated with either the comprehension questions in the read-
through and think-aloud conditions, or with causal think-aloud statements, nor were 
scores on the TONI-3.  Scores on causal comprehension questions in the read-through 
and think-aloud conditions were nearing significance with causal inferences in the think-
aloud.  
Discussion 
The present study was conducted to (1) compare the inferencing abilities of 
children with SLI to children with TLD, as measured by comprehension questions after 
reading; (2) to investigate the inferences made during reading by both groups using a 
think-aloud procedure; and (3) to explore whether use of the think-aloud procedure 
improves reading comprehension of narrative texts for both groups.  The results will be 
discussed as they relate to theories of reading comprehension, and the results of the think-
aloud procedure will be used to shed light on the reading comprehension findings.  
Limitations, practical implications, and directions for future research will also be 
discussed.  
Reading Comprehension 
 According to the simple view of reading proposed by Hoover and Gough (1990), 
reading comprehension is the product of two main components: decoding and oral 
language comprehension.  As each component increases, reading comprehension 
increases.  If either of these two components is impaired, so is reading comprehension.  




increased risk for the development of a reading disability, and often perform below age 
and grade level on reading comprehension compared to their typically developing peers 
(Botting & Adams, 2005; Catts et al., 1999; Norbury & Bishop, 2002; Wright & 
Newhoff, 2001).  
 Although Hoover and Gough's (1990) model of reading has been proposed as a 
‘simple’ view, the authors argue that reading is indeed a complex activity, and that 
multiple skills make up both oral language comprehension and decoding, and thus 
contribute to reading comprehension.  One skill, described by van Kleeck (2008) as 
contributing to reading comprehension via oral language comprehension, is inferencing.  
Several types of inferences have been described in the literature, some of which readers 
make to connect parts of text (text-to-text or cohesive inferences) and others which 
readers make to connect text and world knowledge (text-to-world inferences).  Text-to-
world inferences, the focus of the present study, include informational and causal 
inferences.  When making informational inferences, readers use their world knowledge to 
elaborate a single, explicitly stated proposition in the text.  In causal inferencing, readers 
connect explicitly stated propositions in the text by using their world knowledge to fill in 
information that has only been implied (Van Kleeck, 2008).  Causal inferencing has been 
cited as the most important type of inferencing for successful reading comprehension, as 
readers who consistently make causal connections by linking story propositions during 
reading create a coherent mental representation of the story (Trabasso & Magliano, 
1996b).  
Previous research has shown that children with SLI perform significantly below 




(Bishop & Adams, 1990; Norbury & Bishop, 2002; Wright & Newhoff, 2001).  The 
results of the present study are consistent with these findings; children in the SLI group 
performed significantly below their TLD peers on sets of comprehension questions 
designed to assess literal and inferential understanding.  Given that the participants 
simultaneously listened to and read the stories during testing, and that the stories were 
written below grade-level about familiar or accessible topics, the comprehension results 
are unlikely uniquely due to difficulties with decoding or reading fluency, or to 
inadequate world knowledge.  Indeed, previous research controlling for these variables 
suggests that difficulties in the reading comprehension of poor comprehenders reflect 
difficulty with inferencing (Cain et al., 2001). 
Consistent with results for poor comprehenders (Laing & Kamhi, 2002), children 
with SLI in the present study made significantly fewer informational and causal 
inferences than their TLD peers during the think-aloud.  These findings can be attributed 
to differences in inferencing ability rather than in talkativeness, given that the SLI and 
TLD groups made a similar number of literal statements on the think-aloud, and produced 
comparable numbers of independent clauses on a narrative task.  In addition to making 
fewer inferences, the causal inferences made by the SLI group were more likely to be 
inappropriate or outlandish (given the information provided in the story) than were the 
inferences made by the TLD group.  That is, while children with SLI were able to make 
inferences, the mental representations of the text they created during reading were likely 
less coherent and less accurate than the representations of stronger readers.  A more 
impoverished representation could explain poorer performance on the comprehension 




 Inferencing, although described by van Kleeck (2008) as an oral language skill, 
has alternatively been described in the literature as a skill that relies on both oral 
language and cognitive skills (Kintsch, 1988; Newton et al., 2010).  By definition, 
children with SLI have oral language difficulties.  There is, however, evidence that at 
least some children labeled as SLI exhibit subtle cognitive difficulties that are not 
captured by standardized measures (Silliman & Scott, 2006).  In the present study, 
children with SLI performed significantly below their TLD peers on one measure of 
nonverbal working memory (the Block Recall subtest of the WMTB-C), while group 
performance was comparable on a second measure from the same battery: the Mazes 
Memory subtest.  The test authors have reported that the two subtests are only weakly 
correlated (r = .30), suggesting differences in precisely what each of the two tasks 
measure (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001).  Findings for the Block Recall task indicate that 
for the SLI group, at least some facets of working memory were affected.   
Correlational data showed that there were differential associations of the two 
working memory measures with causal inferencing.  Block Recall scores, but not Mazes 
Memory, were significantly correlated with the language measures, with causal 
inferencing in the think-aloud procedure, and neared significance with the causal 
comprehension scores in the read-through condition.  Furthermore, the Expressive and 
Receptive Language composite scores were each significantly correlated with causal 
comprehension scores in both the read-through and think-aloud conditions.  The 
Expressive Language composite also correlated with causal inferences made during the 
think-aloud procedure, and the Receptive Language neared significance.  Together, these 




related to causal inferencing, and that oral language and working memory contributed to 
the group differences observed on causal inferencing in the present study.  
The correlations observed are in line with Kintsch’s (1988) construction-
integration model of text comprehension.  The model can also be used to explain why the 
SLI group made significantly more inaccurate and outlandish causal inferences than the 
TLD group.  Kintsch (1988) proposed that language comprehension and working 
memory, along with world knowledge, are necessary for inference generation and 
successful text comprehension.  According to Kintsch’s (1988) model, text 
comprehension occurs in two phases.  In the construction phase, language comprehension 
contributes to recognition of word meaning and to the generation of inferences.  In this 
phase, difficulties with oral language comprehension experienced by the SLI group in the 
present study would have led to the generation of incorrect or inaccurate inferences.  In 
the integration phase of comprehension, as each sentence or phrase was being processed 
and integrated to make sense of the story as a whole, difficulties with working memory 
would have inhibited the replacement of incorrect or inaccurate inferences with accurate 
inferences, leading the SLI group to produce lower quality inferences during reading than 
the TLD group, resulting in inadequate story comprehension.  
In terms of performance by inference type, findings by Wright and Newhoff 
(2001) led to the hypothesis that scores on informational questions would be higher than 
scores on causal questions for both the SLI and TLD groups.  This finding was not 
replicated in the present study.  There was no significant difference between 
informational and causal scores for either the SLI or the TLD group.  This discrepancy 




that used in Wright and Newhoff (2001), perhaps enough to elicit varying results.  The 
stories in the present study were intentionally written with numerous gaps in explicit 
information in order to investigate inferences in the think-aloud condition.  The 
informational inferences required might thus have been more difficult than in the stories 
used by Wright and Newhoff (2001).  Their stories may have had greater coherence as 
they were used to assess participant’s story retelling in addition to their offline 
inferencing ability.  Thus, the informational inferencing invited by the text may have 
been less challenging, and, in turn, better than the causal inferencing. 
Secondly, closer inspection of the test data in Wright and Newhoff (2001) reveals 
that while expressive language scores were low in the language impaired group, receptive 
scores were within one standard deviation of the mean.  This contrasts sharply with the 
children in the SLI group in the present study, whose scores on both expressive and 
receptive language tasks were on average two standard deviations below the test mean.  
While informational and causal inferences are differentially important to reading 
comprehension, they could have been equally difficult for children with SLI in the 
present study due to their mixed expressive and receptive language difficulties and the 
severity of the impairments, combined with working memory impairments.  
Think-Aloud Procedure as a Strategy to Improve Comprehension 
Although think-alouds can be considered a "window" into children's thinking, the 
procedure facilitated comprehension for both the TLD and SLI group in the present 
study, results that are consistent with previous research using a think-aloud procedure 
(Laing & Kamhi, 2002; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996a).  The overall comprehension of 




comprehension of the SLI group was borderline significant in the think-aloud condition 
(p = .014 with a Bonferroni adjusted ! = .013).  Thinking aloud about each story 
sentence might have prompted children to make more causal connections while reading 
than they would normally.  This interpretation is supported by findings for children in the 
SLI group, who improved significantly on causal comprehension across conditions (while 
scores on literal and informational questions did increase, the improvement was not 
significant).  It appears that when prompted, children with SLI work to create a more 
coherent mental representation of the text and thus make a greater number of ‘critical’ 
causal inferences, but focus less on making ‘optional’ informational inferences.  
Trabasso and Magliano (1996b) proposed that by making an increased number of 
causal connections during reading, the reader is better able to retain story information in 
working memory and, in turn, the information is more available when readers answer 
comprehension questions after reading.  This reasoning can be applied to the findings in 
the present study.  The think-aloud condition facilitated 'online' causal inferencing, and 
presumably decreased the working memory processing load, which could in turn explain 
the observed improvement in responses to 'offline' causal questions asked after the think-
aloud was complete.  Indeed, the correlation between the Block Recall working memory 
task and causal question scores was nearing significance in the read-through condition (p 
= .055), suggesting that working memory was implicated in answering comprehension 
questions in that condition.  In contrast, working memory was not significantly correlated 
with the causal question scores in the think-aloud condition (p = .626).  These results 
suggest that the think-aloud procedure might have decreased the working memory 




Limitations of the Present Study 
 There are several limitations of the present study that should be addressed.  The 
first relates to the nature and size of the sample.  The present study did not include a 
younger group, matched to the SLI group on some aspect of language ability.  In 
comparing the results of the SLI group to a language-matched group, it might be possible 
to disentangle the effects of language and working memory on causal comprehension and 
inferencing.  With additional participants, more sophisticated statistical analyses could be 
employed to determine the contribution of oral language and working memory to 
inferencing.  Furthermore, larger sample sizes would increase statistical power, perhaps 
allowing several of the study findings, which were borderline or nearing significance, to 
reach significance.  
 A further limitation to the present study was in the coding of the think-aloud 
statements.  Interestingly, there was a tendency for the coders to make inferences about 
the participants’ statements, and to subsequently code statements according to their own 
inferences, rather than the child's, making it difficult to obtain intercoder reliability.  The 
‘blindness’ of the raters to the study’s goals and their more limited knowledge about 
inferencing seemed to affect their ability to monitor their own thoughts and inferences 
about the participant’s statements, despite extensive training on the coding system and its 
application.  When the thesis supervisor reviewed discrepant coding, her scoring tended 
to resemble the scoring of the researcher.  It thus appears that more in-depth training 
about inferencing is required in order to accurately score the think-aloud transcriptions.  
Despite these limitations, the findings of the present study are informative and contribute 




comprehension of school-aged children with language impairments. 
Directions for Future Research and Practical Implications 
 In previous research investigating the reading comprehension of children with 
language impairments, it has been suggested that the difficulty in reading comprehension 
observed in children with language impairments is in part due to difficulty with retrieving 
both the textual and inferential information of the story while simultaneously processing 
the language of the questions generally used to assess comprehension (Norbury & 
Bishop, 2002).  The think-aloud procedure avoids this difficulty, and could be used to 
elucidate whether children with language impairments are making specific inferences 
during reading, but fail to answer comprehension questions requiring the same inferences 
after reading.  
Previous research, as well as the present study, has demonstrated that the think-
aloud can be used to identify group differences in children’s inferencing ability (Laing & 
Kamhi, 2002).  It could also be used to assess developmental changes in comprehension. 
There have not yet been any longitudinal studies tracing the development of children’s 
inferencing ability as they learn to read.  Although transcribing and scoring is a lengthy 
process, further research using the think-aloud procedure could nonetheless be 
informative in identifying developmental changes in the inferencing abilities of typically 
developing children at various ages and stages of development.  
The think-aloud could also be used to assess individual children's reading, or as 
an intervention strategy.  The think-aloud is a practical method that, as has been shown in 
the present study, facilitates the reading comprehension of children with language and 




procedure could be taught to students with language impairments using a direct 
instruction method, in order to eventually be used as a self-directed strategy to maintain 
long-term improvements in comprehension.  Through direct explanation, teacher 
modeling, guided practice, application of the particular strategy, and cooperative 
learning, reading comprehension strategies can be successfully taught within a classroom 
context (NIFL, 2001).  Future research should explore the think-aloud procedure as a 
strategy to improve the reading comprehension of children with language impairments 
during shared storybook reading in a classroom setting.  It is possible that with effective 
guidance from a teacher, gains in comprehension could be made for a number of students 
at once.  
Conclusion 
 The present study has demonstrated that the think-aloud procedure, comprised of 
general prompts that direct the child's attention and elicit statements that reflect his or her 
understanding of the text, is effective in improving the reading comprehension of both 
children with typical language development and children with language impairments.  In 
the present study, the think-aloud procedure revealed that during reading of narrative 
texts, children with SLI made the same number of literal statements as children in the 
TLD group, but fewer informational and causal inferences.  Additionally, the SLI group 
made significantly more inaccurate and outlandish causal inferences, leading to a less 
coherent mental representation of the text and lower comprehension scores.  As is 
explained by Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model of text processing, both 
working memory and oral language skills, which were impaired in the SLI group and 




outlandish inferences.  
Contrary to previous findings, there was no significant difference between 
informational and causal comprehension for the SLI group in the present study, 
suggesting that both types of inferences were equally difficult for children with severe 
expressive and receptive language difficulties.  However, improvement in causal 
comprehension for the SLI group and overall comprehension for the TLD group in the 
think-aloud condition suggests that with prompting, readers make more causal inferences, 
which are critical for comprehension.  In doing so, the reader creates a more coherent 
mental representation of the text, as is reflected in improved performance on offline 
comprehension questions.  The practical implications of these results include the potential 
of the think-aloud procedure as a strategy to improve the inferential comprehension of 
children with language impairments, to be implemented by educators and perhaps 
gradually taught to children so that they might boost their own comprehension, and enjoy 
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Experimental Stories, Spache Readability Analyses, and Comprehension Questions 
Anna and Her Dog 
Anna was walking her dog. 
They stopped by the swings to play.  
Anna’s dog was very good at playing fetch. 
Anna threw the ball over and over again. 
She threw the ball too far.  
It went into the woods.  
Anna waited but her dog didn’t come back.  
Anna looked by the water fountain. 
Her dog was not there. 
She looked by the baseball field. 
The baseball players had not seen her dog.  
Anna looked until it started to get dark.  
Finally, she started to walk home.  
She passed by the swings on her way. 
Her dog was waiting for her with the ball. 






Spache Readability Formula for Anna and her Dog = 
(0.141 * 6.93 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence) + (0.086 * 6.30 Percent of Words in 
Sample Not Found on Spache Revised Word List) + 0.839 = 2.35 Grade Equivalent 
 
Comprehension Questions 
3 Literal:  
1) Where did Anna and her dog stop to play with the ball?  
2) What game did Anna play with her dog? 
3) Where did Anna look for her dog? 
3 Causal: 
1) Why didn’t Anna’s dog come back? 
2) Why did Anna’s dog wait for her by the swings? 
3) How did Anna feel when she found her dog? 
3 Informational: 
1) Where did Anna take her dog for a walk? 
2) Who did Anna ask if they had seen her dog? 





Andrew Goes Skating 
Andrew was skating on a small pond.  
He was skating very fast.  
He was wearing his wool hat, his gloves, and his scarf.  
He skated to the middle of the pond. 
The ice was thin there.  
The ice started to crack. 
Andrew cried out when the ice broke.  
He crashed through the ice.  
A man was walking by the pond. 
He rushed out to save Andrew.  
The man grabbed Andrew by both arms.  
Andrew’s clothes were all wet.  
When he got home, Andrew got wrapped up in a warm blanket.  
He sat down by the fire.  
He drank a cup of hot chocolate.   






Spache Readability Formula for Andrew Goes Skating = 
(0.141 * 6.93 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence)+ (0.086 * 10.81 Percent of Words in 




1) What was Andrew doing at the start of the story? 
2) Who rescued Andrew? 
3 Causal: 
1) Why did Andrew go where the ice was thin?   
2) Why did Andrew sit by the fire when he got home?  
3) How did Andrew feel when he got home? 
4 Informational: 
1) What was Andrew wearing on his feet to keep warm? 
2) What season was it? 
3) Where did Andrew fall through the ice? 





Mark gives a Gift  
Mark wanted to give his mother a gift.  
He wanted it to be very special.  
Mark thought for a long time.  
He knew that chocolate cake was his mother's favorite. 
Mark found all of the ingredients.  
He followed the instructions.  
First he mixed in the sugar, butter and eggs.  
He poured the batter into the pan.  
He put the cake in the oven.  
Mark took the cake out when it was done. 
Mark dropped the pan. 
The cake was okay, but it had a crack in the middle. 
Mark had an idea. 
He made some icing.  
He put lots of icing on the cake. 
He lit the candles. 









Spache Readability Formula for Mark Gives a Gift = 
(0.141 * 6.64 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence)+ (0.086 * 9.73 Percent of Words in 




1) What was Mark’s mother’s favourite dessert? 
2) What did Mark put in the cake batter? 
3) Where did Mark put the cake? 
3 Causal: 
1) Why did Mark want to give his mother a gift? 
2) Why did Mark drop the pan? 
3) Why did Mark put lots of icing on the cake?  
3 Informational: 
1) Where did Mark get the instructions to make the cake? 
2) Where did Mark find all of the ingredients? 





Gabby and the Stroller 
Gabby was walking down the street.  
She turned around the corner.  
In the alley there was a big pile of garbage.  
Gabby saw an old stroller.  
She ran to find her friends.  
They were playing in the park.  
Come and see what I found, she said.  
Gabby and her friends got the stroller down.  
They were careful not to get hurt. 
They took the top part off of the stroller.  
They hammered an old piece of wood onto the wheels.  
They made a steering wheel.  
The children went back to the park. 
Gabby got into the go-cart and raced down the path.  





 Spache Readability Formula for Gabby and the Stroller = 
(0.141 * 7.2 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence)+ (0.086 * 12.96 Percent of Words in 




1) Who did Gabby go to find?  
2) What did the children hammer onto the wheels? 
3) Where did the children go when they had finished making the go-cart? 
3 Causal: 
1) Why did Gabby tell her friends about the stroller? 
2) Why did the children go back to the park? 
3) How did the children feel when they saw Gabby racing in the go-cart?  
3 Informational: 
1) Where did Gabby find the old stroller? 
2) What was the stroller doing on top of the pile of garbage? (Omitted from 
Analyses) 






TONI-3 Sample (Training) Item 







Picture Stories 1 and 2 











Think-aloud Demonstration Stories and Spache Readability Analyses 
 
 
Ivan and the Dragon 
Prince Ivan lived in a castle. 
He had nobody to play with. 
There was a big dragon that lived in the forest nearby. 
One day, the prince went for a walk. 
Ivan heard somebody crying in the forest. 
The dragon was lonely too. 
Ivan was happy to have found a friend. 
(51 words) 
 
Spache Readability Formula for Ivan and the Dragon = 
(0.141 * 7.28 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence) + (0.086 * 13.72 Percent of Words 






Rachel and the Giant  
(Adapted from Trabasso & Magliano, 1996a) 
Rachel was a great fighter. 
One day, Rachel heard that a giant was hurting people in her town. 
Rachel decided to scare the giant away. 
Rachel waited until dark. 
When the giant came, Rachel shot an arrow at him. 
Rachel hit him and the giant fell down. 
All the people in the town were happy. 
(55 words) 
 
Spache Readability Formula for Rachel and the Giant = 
(0.141 * 7.85 Avg. Number of Words Per Sentence) + (0.086 * 1.81 Percent of Words in 







Think-aloud Demonstration Story Scripts 
 
Ivan and the Dragon 
 
Prince Ivan lived in a castle. 
Castles are usually really big and made of stone. Because he lives in a big castle, 
he probably has a big family too. Maybe the Queen and King and his brothers 
and sisters live with him there.  
 
He had nobody to play with. 
So Prince Ivan is probably really lonely. Maybe he doesn’t have brothers and 
sisters after all.  
 
There was a big dragon that lived in the forest nearby. 
He’s probably a scary dragon. Maybe he lives in a cave in the forest. People 
probably stay out of the forest because the dragon is there.  
 
One day, the prince went for a walk. 
Maybe Ivan goes on lots of walks because he doesn’t have any friends, and it’s 
something for him to do. It’s probably a nice, warm day out, and it would be a 
nice day for a walk. 
 
Ivan heard somebody crying in the forest. 
He thought he was all alone! He will probably go to see who is crying. But that 
means he has to go into the forest, and it might be dangerous because of the 
dragon. 
 
The dragon was lonely too. 
It looks like it was the dragon who was crying! Maybe he’s not so scary after all, 
but he has no friends because people think he is scary, just like I did. 
 
Ivan was happy to have found a friend. 
So it looks like Ivan and the dragon will become friends. They were both really 






Rachel and the Giant 
 
Rachel was a great fighter. 
So, Rachel was very good at fighting. She probably fought lots of fights and 
maybe she won a lot. 
 
One day, Rachel heard that a giant was hurting people in her town. 
This probably made Rachel really mad. Because she’s a good fighter, she will 
probably want to fight the giant. 
 
Rachel decided to scare the giant away. 
Since Rachel’s a great fighter, she’s probably really brave. She doesn’t want the 
giant to keep hurting people. Maybe she will fight the giant so that he will stop 
hurting people. 
 
Rachel waited until dark. 
So it looks like Rachel has a plan. Maybe she waited until dark because she wants 
to sneak up on the giant and she doesn’t want the giant to see her coming.  
 
When the giant came, Rachel shot an arrow at him. 
Since Rachel’s such a great fighter, she probably had very good aim even though 
it was dark. Hopefully she’ll hit the giant.  
 
Rachel hit him and the giant fell down. 
Oh! She did hit him. The arrow probably hurt the giant. Hopefully the giant will 
leave and the people in the town don’t need to worry about getting hurt anymore. 
 
All the people in the town were happy. 
So everybody in the town is happy because Rachel was such a great fighter, and 
they don’t need to worry anymore about the big giant coming to hurt them or 




Story Stimulus Book Sample Pages 








Assent Script and Story Prompts 
 
Assent Script 
I’m here to learn about how people understand stories. Today we are going to be reading 
stories, answering some questions about the stories, and doing some other activities that 
will help me see how people understand what they read. Some of these activities might be 
easy, and some might be hard. If ever you find that the activities are too hard and you 
want to take a break, you can let me know. If you ever decide that you want to stop doing 
the activities altogether, you can let me know that too, and that’s fine. We will just go 
back to class. 
 
Picture Story Prompt 
Now we are going to warm up our voices a little. Can you tell me as much as you can 
about the story you see here? 
 
Read-through Prompt 
Now we are going to read a story. We will listen to the story out loud, and we will follow 
along in our heads. At the end of the story, I will ask you some questions about it, so do 
your best to understand the story as we read. 
 
Think-aloud Prompt 
Now we are going to read a story. This time we will do something a little different. We 
will listen to one sentence of the story at a time, and we will follow along in our heads. 
You will see a picture like this on the page (point to Think-aloud picture prompt). When I 
point to this picture, you will explain to me what you understand about the story. I will 




Now it is your turn. Just like when I did it, we will listen to one sentence of a story at a 
time, and we will follow along together. When I point to the picture, this time YOU will 
tell me what you understand about the story. At the end of the story, I will ask you some 
questions about the story, so do your best to understand. Ready? 
 
Comprehension Question Prompt 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about the story. It’s okay to guess at the 
answers.  
 
If child gives a one point/incomplete answer, say: Can you tell me a little more? 






















































Anna and her Dog 
 
  
 P=Prompt (Can you tell me more/Do you want to guess?) 
If prompting elicits a response with a lower score, then only count response given 
before the prompt. 
1. Where did Anna take her dog for a walk? 
2 points: The park 
1 point: by the swings 
0 points: unrelated/incorrect (the water fountain/baseball field)/no response 
2.  Where did Anna and her dog stop to play with the ball?  
2 points: by the swings 
1 point: park/outside/field/close to the woods 
0 points: water fountain/baseball field/unrelated/no response 
3. What game did Anna play with her dog? 
2 points: fetch/throws the ball and the dog goes and gets it 
1 point: ball/catch 
0 points: unrelated/incorrect/no response/baseball 
4. 
 
Why didn’t Anna’s dog come back? 
2 points: it couldn’t find the ball in the woods/it got lost/any reason for distraction (e.g., Saw 
squirrel/another dog) 
1 point: she threw the ball too far (with no explanation), ‘he was looking for it’ with no 
explicit mention of ball/went looking and when he came back Anna wasn’t there 
0 points: unrelated/no response 
5. Where did Anna look for her dog? 
2 points: by the water fountain + at the baseball field (optional- and by swings) 
1 point: one of two elements, or one of two with an incorrect answer (and by the swings)/at 
the park/everywhere 
0 points: incorrect (in the woods)/no response 
6. Who did Anna ask if they had seen her dog? 
2 points: the baseball players 
1 point: unspecific (people in the park) 
0 points: incorrect/no response 
7. What time of day was it when Anna’s dog got lost? 
2 points: afternoon/daytime/indication of it being before dark 
1 point: it was getting dark 
0 points: night/dark/unrelated/no response 
8. Why did Anna’s dog wait for her at the swings? 
2 points: It’s where they were playing/where they started/so Anna could find the dog/he 
came back while Anna was looking 
1 point: it wanted to play with the ball (no mention of returning)/he didn’t know where Anna 
was 
0 points: incorrect/unrelated/no response 
9. How did Anna feel when she found her dog? 
2 points: positive emotion + reason/elaboration (e.g., she thought she’d lost the dog forever, 
she ran and gave the dog a hug) 
1 point: positive emotion but with no reason or elaboration/reason but with a wrong emotion 
(e.g., She was worried and sad and giving the dog hugs)  








 P=Prompt (Can you tell me more/Do you want to guess?) 
If prompting elicits a response with a lower score, then only count response given 
before the prompt. 
1.  What was Andrew doing at the start of the story? 
2 points: Skating + On the pond 
1 point: getting ready to go skating/just skating/wanted to skate 
0 points: Incorrect (e.g., Walking by a pond)/No response 
2. What was Andrew wearing on his feet to keep warm? 
2 points: Wool/warm socks/socks /socks + skates/skates with fur in them 
1 point: skates/socks + incorrect footwear (e.g., Socks & boots) 
0 points: boots/Incorrect/No response 
3. What season was it? 
2 points: Winter/late fall or early spring with mention of ice breaking 
1 point: Beginning of spring (without mention of ice breaking) 
0 points: Incorrect/No response  
4. Where did Andrew fall through the ice? 
2 points: In the middle (of the pond) 
1 point:  On the pond (no mention of middle) 
0 points: Incorrect (e.g., Pond + wrong location)/No response 
5. Why did Andrew go where the ice was thin? 
2 points: He didn’t know (it was thin)/He was skating and didn’t realize 
1 point: he wanted to go to the middle/was skating fast (no mention of not knowing ice was 
thin)/he was in a race 
0 points: No response/unrelated/incorrect 
6. Who rescued Andrew? 
2 points: The man/a guy + who was walking by the pond 
1 point: a man/Andrew’s dad (no mention of walking by pond) 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
7. What did Andrew do with his wet clothes when he got home?  
2 points: He took them off/He hung them up/dried them (in front of the fire) 
1 point: He threw them out/ told his mom (without mention of mom doing something) 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
8. Why did Andrew sit by the fire when he got home?  
2 points: To get warm/he was cold (from falling in pond)/to get dry 
1 point: because he fell through the ice (no mention of being cold/getting warm) 
0 points: Incorrect/Unrelated 
9. How did Andrew feel when he got home? 
2 points: Positive emotion + reason/elaboration (e.g., Happy/relieved + to be home/he was 
safe/gave his mom a hug/mom was taking care of him) 
1 point: emotion without reason/better with no mention of falling through ice/cold/neg. 
emotion with reason (Sad because his clothes were wet) 




Mark Gives a Gift 
  
 P=Prompt (Can you tell me more/Do you want to guess?) 
If prompting elicits a response with a lower score, then only count response given 
before the prompt. 
1.  Why did Mark want to give his mother a gift? 
2 points: it was her birthday 
1 point: because he wanted to make her happy/do something nice for her/because he loved 
her/to surprise her/he liked giving her presents/mother’s day 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect/No response 
2. What was Mark’s mother’s favourite dessert? 
2 points: chocolate + cake 
1 point: one of two elements 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect/No response 
3. Where did Mark get the instructions to make the cake? 
2 points: a recipe (book)/on the box/ from a book 
1 point: he already knew how to make it/from the store 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect/No response 
4. Where did Mark find all of the ingredients? 
2 points: the kitchen/the cupboards/he went to the store/fridge 
1 point: His mom gave them to him/around the house 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect (e.g., cookbook) /No response 
5. What did Mark mix in the cake batter? 
2 points: sugar + butter + eggs (credit if all three elements in responses to Q5&Q6) 
1 point: response with one missing element 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect (e.g. icing)/No response/only 1 of 3 elements 
6. What else did Mark mix into the batter? 
2 points: cocoa or chocolate (+ other cake ingredient) (Credit if mentioned in Q5) 
1 point: any baking ingredient not mentioned in story (e.g. water/flour) with no mention of 
chocolate or cocoa 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect (e.g., icing)/No response 
7. Where did Mark put the cake? 
2 points: in the oven 
1 point: in the pan 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect (e.g., on the counter)/No response 
8. Why did Mark drop the pan? 
2 points: it was hot/he was not wearing oven mitts 
1 point: it was an accident/heavy/he was clumsy/it was slippery/hands were slippery 
0 points: Unrelated/Incorrect/No response 
9. Why did Mark put lots of icing on the cake?  
2 points: to hide or cover the crack/make the cake look nice because there was a crack 
1 point: there was a crack (no mention of hiding/covering the crack), so it would look nice 




Gabby and the Stroller 
 
 P=Prompt (Can you tell me more/Do you want to guess?) 
If prompting elicits a response with a lower score, then only count response given 
before the prompt. 
1. Where did Gabby find the old stroller? 
2 points: In the alley + On top of/in the pile of garbage 
1 point: 1 of 2 elements, near garbage  
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
2.  What was the stroller doing on top of the pile of garbage? 
2 points: Somebody threw it away/It was garbage/broken 
1 point: Sitting on top of the pile (no indication of being thrown away/garbage) 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
3. Who did Gabby go to find?  
2 points: Her friends + In the park 
1 point: No mention of park, or inaccurate (e.g., the kids, a friend, the boy/girl) 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
4. 
 
Why did Gabby tell her friends about the stroller?  
2 points: Help getting it down/wanted to turn it into a go-cart/use it as a go-cart 
1 point: to race it/wanted to show it to them/fix it with no mention of turning into go-cart 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
5. What was in the pile of garbage that could have hurt the children?  
2 points: any sharp object (e.g., (broken) glass or rusty nails)/mention of object + could have 
tripped on/something that could have fallen on them/ “something sharp” with mention of 
how could have hurt children 
1point: Mention of any object that might be found in the garbage with no indication or 
unclear how it could hurt the children/”something sharp” (unspecific)/garbage was big and 
could have fallen 
0 points:  Unrelated/No response 
6. What did the children hammer onto the wheels? 
2 points: old piece of wood/wood 
1 point: steering wheel 
0 points: Incorrect/No response 
7. Where did the children go when they had finished making the go-cart? 
2 points: back to the park/to the race 
1 point: path, with no mention of park 
0 points: Incorrect/no location (e.g., they raced)/No response 
8. Why did the children go back to the park? 
2 points: mention of go-cart & race 
1 point: To play (on the go-cart)/ride the go-cart with no mention of the race, or race with no 
mention of go-cart 
0 points: Incorrect (e.g., to play on the swings)/No response 
9. How did the children feel when they saw Gabby racing in the go-cart?  
2 points: Positive emotion + reason/elaboration (e.g., Happy/proud + she won, the go-cart 
they built was fast, they cheered) 
1 point: Any positive emotion with no reason 







Sample Think-Aloud Transcription 
 
 
 Mark Gives a Gift 
 
Participant: C05MQ     Date: 
Date of birth: 
Session: 2-1      Condition: TA 
 
 Think-Aloud Statements 
 
Caus. Info Eval Lit. Un. 
1. Mark wanted to give his mother a gift.       
1. He probably wanted to give his mother a 
gift 
     
2. Because it might be mother’s day      
2.  He wanted it to be very special.       
1. He really liked his mom      
2. So he was making it very special      
3. Mark thought for a long time.       
1. Mark was thinking      
2. Because he probably couldn’t think of 
something really cool 
     
4. 
 
He knew that chocolate cake was his mother's 
favorite. 
     
1. I think he will decide to make a chocolate 
cake 
     
5. Mark found all of the ingredients.       
1. He probably helped his mom whenever 
she made chocolate cake 
     
2. So maybe he might know how to make it      
6. He followed the instructions.       
1. His mom probably had a cake recipe book      
7. First he mixed in the sugar, butter and eggs.       
1. So I guess he has a recipe book      
8. He poured the batter into the pan.       
1. His mom probably had batter in the 
cupboards 
     
9. He put the cake in the oven.       
1. He should be careful      
2. Because he might burn himself      





Statement Type 2 points 1 point 0 points 
Literal    
Informational    
Causal    
Inferential    
Prop. Total Statements Inferential  
  
 1. So I guess he didn’t burn himself      
2. And he did it easily      
11. Mark dropped the pan.      
1. His hands were probably slippery      
2. And the tray fell out of his hand      
12. The cake was okay, but it had a crack in the 
middle. 
     
1. It probably because he dropped it      
2. And the tray landed right on the floor      
13. Mark had an idea.      
1. I think he might take some icing      
2. And glue it together      
14. He made some icing.       
1. So he probably made some       
2. Instead of getting some      
15. He put lots of icing on the cake.      
1. I think there might be too much icing      
2. And the cake might fall apart again      
16. He lit the candles.      
1. I guess the cake didn’t fall apart      
2. And he lit the candles      
3. And it was his mom’s birthday      
17. Mark’s mother was very happy.       
1. So it didn’t go after a disaster after all      
2. So I think it was his mom’s birthday and 
stuff 
     
 Total Statements 
 
     
 Total Statements Scored 2 points      
 Total Statements Scored 1 point      
 Total Statements Scored 0 points      












Rule   Example 
Segment all utterances into separate clauses, 
which communicate a main idea.  
Generally, each clause will be indicated by a 
main verb along with any of the following 
rules: 
o “Peter went to the store.”  “The dog 
ran after the ball.” 
Include in a single clause:  
• Infinitives  
o Simple (including 
wanna/gonna etc)  
o  ‘wh’ (marked by conjunctions 
what, who, where, when and  
by to) 
o unmarked (headed by make, 




• Full propositional complements 
expressing actions or events in the 
story (headed by ‘cognitive’ verbs 
e.g., think, guess, wish, know, hope, 
wonder; may/may not contain the 
conjunction that; or headed by 
‘speech’ verbs i.e., said, shouted, told, 
asked (introducing) dialogue 
 
• Clauses expressing participant’s 
perspective  (e.g., I think … I know…  
I forgot … I assume… I guess … This 
means…It seems…  etc.)  
 
• Relative clauses (i.e., clauses with a 
relative pronoun such as ‘that’ or 
‘which’) 
 
• Evaluation: reader makes a 
judgement/evaluation of an action or 
event described by focal sentence 
 
 
o “He has to move.” “They wanna 
run.”  
o “I know what to do.”  
 
 
o “Watch me jump.”  “Help me pick 







o “She wondered what she would do 
next.” 
o  “She said he’s a scaredy-cat.”  
o “He thought that the boy was 
drowning.” 
 
o “I assume that he went into the 
cave.” 
o “I think that it’s his mother’s 
birthday.” 
 
o “That’s not the kind that I like”  




o “Oh no!” /“That’s good news!”/ “I’m 
glad (that) he was careful.” 
Include as separate clauses: 
• Infinitives expressing a separate idea 
 








• Wh Clause (e.g., what, who, where, 
when, how, why), or temporal terms 
(e.g., while, before, after, once)  
 
• Conditional clauses 
 
 
• Conjoined clauses (using and, or, so, 
but), that express new ideas, even if 
subject and/ or verb is not restated  
 
 
• Subordinate clauses  
 
 
• Implied verbs: if verb is absent but 
implied (ellipsis) but there is more 
than one idea that is expressed, code 
each idea as a separate clause.  
the ball.”  
o “It was too heavy/ so we needed to 
get more people/ and lift it together.”  
 




o “If he doesn’t put the icing on/ the 
crack will show. “ 
 
o “He turned on the computer / and sat 
in the chair” 
o  “He was relieved/ and happy.”  
 
 
o “The cat ran up the tree / because it 
was scared of the dog” 
 







Think-aloud Statement Scoring Key 
 
 
Number statements sequentially by focal sentence: 1.1, 1.2 … 6.1, 6.2 etc.  
 
Chain: a series of explanatory or informational statements. One statement may become 




Consider each statement in order from the first statement to the last statement in a chain. 
Always try to relate a statement 1) to the focal sentence 2) to previous statements in the 
chain, beginning with the first statement and moving down the chain.  
 
1. IS THE STATEMENT LITERAL? ! LITERAL  
Is the statement a repetition or paraphrase of the current focal sentence or a 
statement in the current chain? 
e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
  Current TA Statement: He fell off of his bike.  
• Inserting character names for he/she (or vice versa) is not considered as added 
information (therefore typically considered as literal) 
• Watch out for synonyms and fillers including ‘because’ & ‘so’ with no causal 
link 
• If a statement is a literal repetition of the current focal sentence but is not the 
first statement following the focal sentence or is a literal repetition of a 
previous focal sentence AND the statement corresponds to causal (as in #2), 
score as causal  
2. DOES THE STATEMENT COMMUNICATE CAUSE AND EFFECT?  ! 
CAUSAL  
• A child might say “because” or “so” before every statement, this does not 
always indicate causality 
• The statement or focal sentence answers a ‘why’ question 
Does the current statement answer a why question/express the cause about 
the focal sentence/statement in a chain preceding it? 
e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
  Current TA Statement: He rode his bike over a rock.  
a. Cause: Does the current think-aloud statement answer a ‘why’ question 
related to the immediate focal sentence (Read focal sentence, ask ‘why’: If 
current think-aloud statement answers, code as causal)? 
b. Cause: Does the current think-aloud statement answer a ‘why’ question 
related to a statement in the immediate chain (Read first or previous think-
aloud statement, ask ‘why’: If current think-aloud statement answers, code 




Does the statement express the effect of events/actions/states, etc. stated 
either in the focal sentence or own TA statement? 
 e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
  Current TA Statement: He scraped up his knee. 
c. Effect: Does the focal sentence answer a ‘why’ question related to the 
current statement (Read current think-aloud statement, ask ‘why’; if focal 
sentence answers, code as causal)?  
d. Effect: Does a previous statement in the immediate chain answer a ‘why’ 
question related to the current statement (Read current think-aloud 
statement, ask ‘why’; if previous think-aloud statement answers, code as 
causal)? 
• Remember: If a statement is a literal repetition of the current focal sentence 
but is not the first statement following the focal sentence or of a previous focal 
sentence AND the statement corresponds to causal (as in #2), score as causal.  
o In other words: Does the speaker seem to be repeating a previous focal 
sentence in order to tie events together? 
• Verify cause and effect with “If not A, then not B”, where either A or B can 
be the focal sentence or a statement in a chain  
OR 
DOES THE STATEMENT INVOLVE PLANS, INTENTIONS OR EXPLICIT 
REFERENCE TO FUTURE EVENTS ! CAUSAL 
e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
       Current TA Statement: He’s going to put a band-aid on his knee. 
• “If-Then” statements are typically scored as causal, but may refer to already 
stated events/states and thus be coded as other items. 
a. Does it answer a ‘what will/will not/might/might not happen next’ 
question related to the focal sentence? 
b. Does it answer a ‘what will/might happen next’ question related to a 
statement in a chain? 
c. Is the speaker referring explicitly to a preceding focal sentence? 
3. DOES THE STATEMENT FIT THE INFORMATIONAL CATEGORY?  ! 
INFORMATIONAL 
• Is the current statement a literal repetition or paraphrase of the current focal 
sentence with added information?  
• Remember: Inserting character names for he/she is not considered as added 
information (therefore typically considered as literal) 
e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
 Current TA statement: when he was riding down the hill. 
a. Does it answer a ‘what, who, where, when’ question related to the focal 
sentence or to characters, events, or objects more generally? 
b. Does it answer a ‘what, how, who, where, when’ question related to a 
statement in a chain or to characters, events, or objects more generally? 
4. IS THE STATEMENT EVALUATIVE? DOES IT ELABORATE A LITERAL 
STATEMENT WITH AN EVALUATION? 
• Embedded evaluations (e.g., nice cup of cocoa, daring boy) are typically 




• Ignore comments where the speaker evaluates his/her own think-aloud 
statements e.g., “I was wrong” or “I don’t know”  
e.g., Focal sentence/Previous TA statement: The boy fell off his bike. 
  Current TA statement: That’s really scary.  
a. Is the statement marked by the use of “that/it is _____”? e.g., “That’s 
bad!”/”Oh no, that’s dangerous!” 
b. Does the reader judge/evaluate a state, event, action, or object described 
by the focal sentence/preceding statement based on world knowledge, 





 $ 2 points:  close paraphrase (i.e., pronoun/noun exchange) or exact repetition of the  
sentence read, no extra information given 
 
o Exact or near-exact repetition of focal sentence or part of focal sentence that 
maintains important information (e.g., Changing a! the, changing subject to 
pronoun) 
o Close paraphrase if the clause represents a transformation of the focal 
sentence or of a previous statement (such as changing tense) that preserves its 
meaning 
 $ 1 point:  partially correct but makes an error that leads to a significant change in 
                        meaning or renders part of a sentence ambiguous. Points should not be     
                        deducted for grammatical errors that do not change meaning.  $ 0 points:  statements that are incorrect, don’t make sense  
 
Causal, Informational & Evaluative Inferential Statements  
 $ 2 points: relevant and logically linked to the text or to a previous inference and  
makes sense given the context of the story $ 1 point:  inference related to the story, but information is omitted or wording is    
such that the inference is not fully accurate  $ 0 points:     “outlandish”, inference doesn’t make sense given the information  





o Statement provides an answer to a why question.  
o Statement connects events and actions in the story that are consecutive or more 
distant (e.g., sentences at the beginning and end of the story) by explicitly stating 




o Statement expresses an internal state (desires, feelings, thoughts, attitudes) that 
serves as either cause or effect of another state, event, or action 
o Statement may involve using world knowledge to determine cause or effect or 
linking two parts of text by relating them in a cause-effect relationship 
o Statement provides an answer to ‘what will/might happen next?’ 
o Statement provides information about what character(s) intend to/plan to do  
o Statement explicitly refers to future events (with a consequential quality) 
! May be expressed in certain terms (e.g., going to; gonna; will)  
! May be expressed in less certain terms (e.g., I guess; might; should; could; 
probably will; maybe will/going to, etc.)  
o Statement scored regardless of whether it is substantiated by future text or not 
 
Informational 
o Statements provide answers to what, how, who, where, when questions  
o Statement involves an inference about states, events, objects, or actions expressed 
in the focal sentence but does not involve cause and effect relationships 
o Such statements include  
! Elaboration of event or actions 
! Elaboration of words or concepts 
! expressions of manner (usually indicated by adverbs);  
! descriptions of objects (qualitative or quantitative but not truly evaluative)  
! descriptions of characters (including actual and potential internal states) 
! immediate locations (locatives such as behind, under);  
! identification and description of settings (place, location, destination);  
! specification of spatial information; 
! specification of temporal information (time, season, etc.) 
 
Evaluation 
o Reader makes a judgment/evaluation of a state, event, action, or object described 
by the focal sentence based on world knowledge, social conventions, or own 
values.  
o e.g., (from JAO_TA2 Gabby [9.1]) “it’s good that they were careful” 
o 2 points: statement in which the reader’s evaluation or judgment is explicit 
(e.g., “That’s good/that’s bad/oh no! That’s dangerous!”) 
o 1 point: statement in which the reader’s evaluation/judgment is implicit 
(e.g., “Oh no!/wow!”) 
 
Uninterpretable 
o Coder cannot interpret statement due to semantic, phonological, and/or syntactic 
errors  
o Do not assign points for uninterpretable statements (count only as total number of 
uninterpretable statements) 
